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INTRODUCTION
Quantum meruit is a legal action based on equitable restitution.
It is, among other things, an alternate remedy to an action on a
contract which can be brought for partial performance. It is very
much an alternative "shadow" system. A law student who first en-
counters it in Contracts I often feels like the biology student who is
told that, in addition to a circulatory system, there is also a lym-
phatic system hidden within the circulatory system. Quantum me-
ruit can best be described as residual equity - a place to turn when
there has been partial performance of a contract in a tricky new
substantive area or where unfairness would result from contract en-
forcement. It is not accidental that this Article has been written by
a woman law professor. Such an interest in residual equity was pre-
dicted by Carrie Menkel-Meadow in Portia in a Different Voice:
Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process,' when she noted
that equity, as the flexible part of the system, represents the more
feminine voice, while law, which has rules limiting discretion, repre-
sents the more masculine voice. Menkel-Meadow also noted that
one of the problems in the present legal structure is that the domi-
nant male voice often undermines the female voice of flexibility. As
this Article goes from the early development of quantum meruit to
current applications, the reader should be sensitive to the fact that
the early flexibility has become rule-bound; however, flexibility has
been maintained in the sense that courts turn to equity-based quan-
1. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering
Process, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 39-40 (1985).
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turn meruit when all else fails, for example, when courts face new
questions such as palimony or newly recognized clients' rights when
sued by attorneys for contingency fees.
Procedurally, quantum meruit is the name of a legal action
brought to recover compensation for work done and labor performed
"where no price has been agreed." 2 The term literally means "as
much as is deserved"'3 and often can be seen as the legal form of
equitable restitution. While the history of restitution generally was
delineated by the development and drafting of the Restatement of
Restitution in 1937,' the development of quantum meruit itself has
never been clearly described or reported. In spite of this lack of his-
torical perspective and the confusion this void has caused, quantum
meruit has experienced a burgeoning number of applications in
twentieth-century American law in cases concerning physicians'
fees, attorneys' fees, government contracts, and the recently evolving
domestic relations category often referred to as "palimony." 5 While
the courts have developed unique rules for each of these situations,
the doctrinal underpinnings in quantum meruit remain.
The emergence of quantum meruit occurred at the same time the
action of assumpsit was expanding. Initially, most of the major
quantum meruit developments took place in trades of common call-
ing (e.g., innkeeper, tailor, etc.), as the law exerted more control
over these positions. The forms of pleading in assumpsit were also
being simplified, and the "common counts," which included a claim
for "work and labor performed," eventually were available for any
claim of indebtedness for services performed.6 This was true regard-
less of whether the claim was based on an express, implied-in-fact,
or implied-in-law contract.
With such traditional confusion concerning the use of restitution-
ary terms and remedies such as quantum meruit in both legal schol-
arship and court opinion, there arises an obvious fear that with the
developing official recognition and application of restitution in
2. JOHN H. MUNKMAN, THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS 87 (1950). Munkman adds the re-
quirement that there have been no agreed upon price for the work or labor, but as will be dis-
cussed, this may not always be the case.
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1243 (6th ed. 1990): "The common count in an action of as-
sumpsit for work and labor,.founded on an implied assumpsit or promise on the part of the de-
fendant to pay the plaintiff as much as he reasonably deserved to have for his labor." Id.
4. 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 4 (1978).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 196-374 (analyzing quantum meruit as applied to physi-
cians' fees, attorneys' fees, government contracts, and palimony, respectively).
6. 1 PALMER, supra note 4, at 7.
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American law, the confusion and misapplication of the above con-
cepts will be even further perpetuated. Ironically, at least one legal
publication has gone so far as to say that quantum meruit is "prac-
tically obsolete, ' 7  a characterization belied by current develop-
ments. While quantum meruit claims are often (but not always) in
restitution, many of the guiding principles are unique.8 With such in
mind, it is the purpose of this work to first examine the history of
quantum meruit. A discussion of the re-emergence and practical ap-
plication of quantum meruit in twentieth-century contract law and
the unique uses of quantum meruit in the areas of physicians' fees,
lawyers discharged under contingency contracts, government con-
tracts, and palimony will follow.
I. THE HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF QUANTUM MERUIT
A. Preliminary Matters
In order to understand quantum meruit, there are some "explica-
tive concepts" which must be discussed.9 These related terms must
be fully comprehended because they are often used to describe resti-
tution and quantum meruit; additionally, many authors, law profes-
sors, and judges who casually apply these terms, often incorrectly, to
the explication of these and other legal subjects, assume that the
readers, students, or litigants already understand the meanings of
the terms. In order for this work to be complete and for the reader
to have a reference for understanding what is to follow in later sec-
tions, such terms must be given adequate explanation. These terms
are: actions at law, actions in equity,. contracts implied in law (often
referred to as quasi-contracts), contracts implied in fact, expec-
tancy, reliance, restitution, and general assumpsit.'0
1. Actions "At Law" and Actions "In Equity"
The two concepts of "actions at law" and "actions in equity" are
7. 7 C.J.S. Action of Assumpsit'§ 3 (1980). George Palmer's treatise The Law of Restitution
does not even index the term quantum meruit. I PALMER, supra note 4.
8. Often quantum meruit can be seen as a form of legal restitution, following the basic restitu-
tionary principle of preventing unjust enrichment. Quantum meruit, however, can also be utilized
to establish an alternative value for partial performance under a contract. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 179-95.
9. The term "explicative" does not imply that these terms exist only to explain restitution and
quantum meruit; they may be employed in other completely independent contexts, as well as ex-
isting as independent concepts of their own.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 141-51 for a discussion of general assumpsit.
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the result of England's historical development of remedies.11 Com-
mon law courts began as a result of the Magna Carta, which de-
clared that appeals to justice should no longer be the business of the
king alone. 2 Justices were appointed by the king to hear "common
pleas."' 3 At the same time, there still remained a "privy council" -
a select group of the king's highest officers, headed by the king him-
self, who presided over applications for royal discretion in criminal
and civil matters.' 4 One such officer was the chancellor, who was the
keeper of the royal seal. 5 At first the Chancery, over which the
chancellor presided, handled matters concerning royal documents
such as charters, writs, and grants.'" Eventually, however, the duties
of the chancellor became more judicial in nature. Citizens who
could not find an adequate remedy in the common law court system
would often appeal directly to the king and his council, and the cus-
tom eventually developed where the king channeled royal petitions
that requested unique remedies directly to the chancery.' 7
During the reign of Edward Ill, the court of the chancery evolved
into a distinct court where matters of royal "grace and favor" were
remedied.' 8 Although the court of the chancery was developed as
more of a royal "catch all" when the common law courts failed to
provide a remedy, it eventually became a distinct and independent
forum. The inflexibility and rigidity of common law, its arduous pro-
cedures, and the inadequacy of its remedies drove people to the
chancellor as a court of first resort.'" While the common law courts
were locked into their own precedents "at law" and acted in rem,20
the chancery court, acting in personam, 2" could adapt its law, proce-
11. ARCHIBALD H. THROCKMORTON, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 1-9 (2d ed.
1923).
12. Id. at 5.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 5-6.
15. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 85 (2d ed. 1979). "The chan-
cellor has always been primarily an officer of state and a minister of the crown. Most medieval
chancellors were also bishops or even archbishops. Some chancellors, notably Cardinal Wolsey
(1515-29) and Lord Clarendon (1658-67), were prime ministers in all but name." Id.
16. Id. at 84.
17. THROCKMORTON, supra note 11, at 7.
18. Id. at 8. The reign of Edward 11 was from 1327 to 1377.
19. Id. at 9.
20. "In rem" literally means "against the thing." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 793 (6th ed.
1990). The term generally applies to disputes concerning property. Id.
21. "In personam" literally means "against the person." Id. at 791. By acting in personam, a
court adjudicates a person's rights, rather than the disposition of property. Id.
404 [Vol. 42:399
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dures, and remedies to new situations and thus provide an "equita-
ble" (i.e., fair) result.2 The end product was a legal system com-
prised of two independent fora: the common law, or "at law" courts,
and the chancery, or "in equity" courts.2 3
Although the common law courts were later able to break out of
their rigid molds and develop new pleas and remedies,24 the chan-
cery courts, or courts of equity as they became known,28 retained
most of their original procedures and jurisdiction, and still do in
America today, especially in matters of fiduciary duty, fraud, mis-
take, and duress.2 6 The American judicial system recognizes the law
and equity distinction in a variety of ways. All federal courts have
jurisdiction both at law and in equity but consider them together 27
in one form of action. 8 Some states have the same jurisdictional
organization as the federal courts, while others still retain separate
courts for actions in equity. The degrees of jurisdiction, pleas, and
procedure also come in a number of forms,29 but equity still remains
the alternative to an action for which there is no plea or remedy at
law.
Even though the rigid distinction between actions at law and suits
in equity has been abolished, at least in part, there are important
residual considerations. For example, in seeking an equitable rem-
edy, even in the federal court context, inadequacy of a common law
remedy must be pled.30 Similarly, when requesting an injunction in
a federal court, one must first allege an irreparable injury."' The
22. THROCKMORTON, supra note 11, at 14. It must be noted that the chancery courts did not
perceive themselves as applying their own form of law; rather, "[t]hey were making sure that
justice was done in cases where shortcomings in the regular procedure, or human failings, ren-
dered its attainment by due process unlikely." BAKER, supra note 15, at 87.
23. THROCKMORTON, supra note 11, at 15-16. There also existed a court system administered
by the Church, or ecclesiastical courts. Its judgments were governed by Canon law, and its juris-
diction covered such areas as "family matters and wills, sexual offenses, defamation and breach of
faith." BAKER, supra note 15, at 111-12. Some of their jurisdiction remained even until the nine-
teenth century. Id. at 114.
24. The common law courts' later development will be discussed further in the section on the
historical development of quantum meruit. See infra text accompanying notes 141-51.
25. "Equity was a classical notion, defined by Aristotle as 'a correction of law where it is defec-
tive owing to its universality.' " BAKER, supra, note 15, at 90.
26. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION Pt. I, introductory note, at 9 (1937).
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. "These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in
all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity .... " Id.
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 2. "There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action.' " Id.
29. THROCKMORTON, supra note 11, at 19.
30. Id. at 17.
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
A temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral notice to the
19921
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necessity of an inadequate legal remedy before an equitable plea is
permissible can be traced to the competition between common law
judges and equity's chancellor in the Tudor and Stuart revolutions
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.3 2 The common law
judges won the battle, hence the prerequisite of inadequate legal
remedy.,33 A party could not go to a court of equity without first
alleging that law was inadequate.3 4
2. Contracts Implied in Law and Contracts Implied in Fact
Actions at law and actions in equity should not be confused with
"contracts implied in law" and "contracts implied in fact." The
phrase "in law" may lead one to think that contracts implied in law
are pled only at law. Not true. As a matter of fact, contracts im-
plied in law have their doctrinal roots in equity.35 Additionally, con-
tracts implied in law are not merely the flip side of contracts implied
adverse party or that party's attorney only if (1) it clearly appears from specific facts
shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury,
loss, or damage will result to the applicant ....
Id. (emphasis added).
The requirement of irreparable injury means an injury unable to be "repaired" with legal dam-
ages. II CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
2944 (1973). The requirement that one must first find law inadequate before going to equity,
while based on a sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English court struggle, is very much a part of
modern federal practice.
32. ARTHUR ROSETT, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION 298 (4th ed. 1988).
33. Id.
During the Tudor and Stuart revolutions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
the medieval order was replaced by an increasingly centralized national state. The
limiting jurisdictional concepts of common law proved a constraint not only on judges
but upon kings. The Crown and its bureaucratic servants became stronger and eventu-
ally claimed the right to rule absolutely without the restraints of law and the cumber-
some procedures that lawyers fostered. In time, the law and professional lawyers be-
came a major political opposition group opposing this new royal power. Judges and
Chancellors competed for power and the common law insisted on its primacy. In the
end the common lawyers won. Equity will not act in cases properly cognizable at law;
if damages provide an adequate remedy, the Chancellor will not intervene.
Id.
34. It is important to note that:
The principles by which a person is entitled to restitution are the same whether the
proceeding is one at law or in equity, although in some cases the limitations which the
courts of law imposed upon themselves in rendering a judgment have prevented ac-
tions at law where restitution would be allowed in equity and in many situations a
proceeding in equity is denied because the remedy at law is adequate.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION pt. I, introductory note, at 4 (1937).
35. The development of contracts implied in law will be explained further in the section on the
historical development of quantum meruit. See infra text accompanying notes 152-62.
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in fact.8 6 Contracts implied in fact and contracts implied in law are
fundamentally different, the former having an evidentiary base and
the latter having a fictional base created by the courts to afford a
remedy.3 7 Contracts implied in fact are simply unwritten, nonex-
plicit contracts that are treated as express written contracts because
the words or actions of the parties involved are based on some type
of consensual transaction. 8 For example, suppose that A, a builder
of houses, has loaded up trucks and bought materials to specification
in order to build a house for B. B, in turn, has taken out a loan for a
large sum. B, however, suddenly claims there is no contract and
withdraws from the transaction. Although there may not have been
an express written contract upon which A can sue, the actions of A,
as well as the actions of B, blatantly appear to be based on a con-
tract, and most courts would not hesitate to hold B liable under an
implied-in-fact contract. Like an express contract, a contract im-
plied in fact is one where both parties intended to contract (i.e.,
there was a meeting of the, minds). The only thing absent from a
contract implied in fact is the written agreement. An express con-
tract is evidenced by express terms while an implied-in-fact contract
is evidenced by facts and circumstances surrounding the situation.39
Contracts implied in law, on the other hand, "are in no sense gen-
uine contracts."4 They have been described as "all noncontractual
obligations which are treated, for the purpose of affording a remedy,
as if they were contracts."41 There usually has been no meeting of
the minds, no mutual consent. In general, most contracts implied in
law involve the unjust enrichment of one party. "2 The court treats
the situation as if it were a contract in order to give the injured
party a remedy and prevent unjust enrichment of the other party.4 3
The court (the law) implies a fictitious promise to pay where there
was in fact no promise."'
36. 3 WILLIAM H. PAGE, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 2551 (2d ed. 1920).
37. Morse v. Kenney, 89 A. 865, 866 (Vt. 1914).
38. Id.; see also Wojahn v. National Union Bank, 129 N.W. 1068, 1077 (Wis. 1911) (stating
that a contract implied in fact differs from an express contract only in the methods of proof).
39. Columbus, H.V. & T. Ry. v. Gaffney, 61 N.E. 152, 153 (Ohio 1901).
40. FREDERIC C. WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI CONTRACTS 6 (1913).
41. Id. at I.
42. Implied-in-law "contractual" obligations can also be based "[u]pon a record" and "[ulpon
a statutory, or official, or customary duty." WILLIAM A. KEENER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
QUASI-CONTRACTS 16 (1893).
43. 1 PALMER, supra note 4, at 3.
44. Morse v. Kenney, 89 A. 865, 866 (Vt. 1914).
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While the actual consensual transaction is absent, the rigidity of
Anglo-American legal thought requires some tangible basis for en-
forcement of an implied-in-law contract. Without explicitly admit-
ting that this method of remedy is one with its real base in fairness,
the court imposes a "fictional" promise into the situation - where
there was in fact none at all.45 Thus, once the court has interjected
such a promise against the enriched party, it has a contract it can
enforce. In a truer sense, the court can force the fictionally breach-
ing party (i.e., the enriched party) to perform; the performance re-
quired is to compensate the injured party. " Woodward, in his work
The Law of Quasi Contracts, stated that there are only two "essen-
tial elements" of a contract implied in law: "(1) [t]hat the defend-
ant has received a benefit from the plaintiff," and "(2) [t]hat the
retention of the benefit by the defendant is inequitable.""7
Returning to our example of the home builder, suppose that A
has completed a house on B's property. The contract itself, however,
was signed by C who claimed to be, but was not, an agent of B with
the authority to act on B's behalf. B has certainly benefitted from
A's work and labor, since there is a 'new house on B's property.
While there may not be a binding contract between A and B, most
courts would permit A nevertheless to recover the value of his ser-
vices, as well as the value of any materials purchased, based upon
an implied-in-law contract.48
In comparing implied-in-law contracts to implied-in-fact con-
tracts, it has been said that:
In one case the contract is mere fiction, a form imposed in order to adopt
the case to a given remedy; in the other it is a fact legitimately inferred. In
one, the intention is disregarded; in the other, it is ascertained and enforced.
In one, the duty defines the contract; in the other, the contract defines the
duty.49
45. Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 465, 468 (1857).
46. Compare this difference between a contract implied in law and a contract implied in fact
with constructive and implied conditions. Constructive conditions, like implied-in-law contracts,
are imposed by courts for reasons of fairness, whereas implied conditions, like implied-in-fact
contracts, are inferred from the intent of the parties. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
226 cmt. c (1981). This interpretation also lends support to the use of the term constructive con-
tract for contracts implied in law.
47. WOODWARD, supra note 40, at 9. There are some instances, however, where a court will
deny a recovery, notwithstanding the presence of both of these elements, based on public policy or
some other reason. Id. One example would be where the plaintiff conferred a benefit upon the
defendant based upon an illegal contract to which both were a party. Id. at 212.
48. See KEENER, supra note 42, at 326.
49. Hertzog, 29 Pa. at 468.
[Vol. 42:399
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Many legal scholars refer to contracts implied in law as "quasi-
contracts" because of their fictional aspect." Quasi- contract may in
fact be the better term since it would eliminate some of the confu-
sion associated with the term "contract implied in law."' Courts
have also referred to them as actions ex contractu or constructive
contracts.5 2 Whatever the term, the idea remains - a contract im-
posed upon an enriched party requiring that party to render per-
formance by compensating the deprived party. This distinction be-
tween implied-in-fact and implied-in-law contracts, while seemingly
of academic interest only, is critical, for example, when suing the
United States government. Courts have no jurisdiction over implied-
in-law or "quasi-contract" claims against the federal government. 3
Much more will be said about the development of contracts implied
in law, as their history is inextricably connected to the development
of quantum meruit 4
50. ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 19, at 44 (1963); WOODWARD, supra note
40, at 6.
51. WOODWARD, supra note 40, at 6. Contracts implied in law owe their origins to Roman law
and were referred to as actions quasi ex contractu. Sir Henry Sumner Maine in his treatise on
Roman law stated:
This word "quasi," prefixed to a term of Roman law, implies that the conception to
which it serves as an index is connected with the conception with which the compari-
son is instituted by a strong superficial analogy or resemblance. It does not denote
that the two conceptions are the same, or that they belong to the same genus. On the
contrary, it negatives the notion of an identity between them; but it points out that
they are sufficiently similar for one to be classed as the sequel to the other . . . and
employed without violent straining in the statement of rules which would otherwise be
imperfectly expressed.
SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE. ANCIENT LAW 333 (1878). The term contract implied in law will
nonetheless be utilized throughout this work since courts of today tend to use this term more often
than quasi-contract.
52. See, e.g., Dunn v. Phoenix Village, Inc., 213 F.Supp. 936 (W.D. Ark. 1963):
Quasi or constructive contracts (commonly referred to as contracts implied in law)
are obligations which are imposed or created by law without regard to the assent of
the party bound, "on the ground that they are dictated by reason and justice, and
which are allowed to be enforced by an action ex contractu."
Id. at 951 (quoting 17 C.JS. Contracts § 6). See also Donovan v. Kansas City, 175 S.W.2d 874
(Mo. 1943) (using "constructive contract" and "quasi-contract" interchangeably).
53. See Donald A. Wall & Robert Childres, The Law of Restitution and the Federal Govern-
ment, 66 Nw. U. L. REV. 587 (1971). See also infra text accompanying notes 276-332 (discussing
government contracts).
54. See infra text accompanying notes 70-162 discussing the historical development of quantum
meruit.
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3. Expectancy, Reliance, and Restitution
There exist in the contemporary legal system three identifiable
interests, or purposes, that can be injured when a plaintiff's at-
tempted transaction, or contract, fails; by applying legal and equita-
ble remedies, the courts seek to fulfill these interests. These interests
are expectation, reliance, and restitution."5 Individual facts and cir-
cumstances of each case will dictate the interest, or interests, to be
protected. These individual facts and circumstances, the plaintiff's
disposition over the failed transaction, the particular court's disposi-
tion over the case, and the controlling law will determine whether
the plaintiff's best remedy lies in being put in a pre-performance or
post-performance position.56
a. The expectancy interest
An expectancy interest is protected or remedied by placing the
injured party in the position she would have occupied had the
breaching party performed the contract (i.e., the injured party seeks
a post-performance position) .5 This post-performance position is
measured by the net gain the injured party sought to achieve by
entering the failed transaction. By its own terminology, an expec-
tancy remedy attempts to fulfill the injured party's reasonable ex-
pectations when entering the attempted transaction.58 For example,
suppose our builder, A, enters into an express contract with B to
build a house for B. Before A can complete the house, B breaches.
A may sue B on the express contract and seek the profit that would
have been made had B not breached. In other words, A may sue for
the profit she had expected to receive.
b. The reliance interest
A reliance interest is protected by placing the injured party in a
pre-performance position, 59 requiring that the breaching party reim-
burse the injured party for money spent by the injured party in jus-
tifiable reliance on the breaching party's promise to perform. The
55. ROSETT, supra note 32, at 339. See also L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reli-
ance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 54 (1936) (discussing the interests of the
plaintiff that may be injured).
56. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 55, at 54.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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nonbreacher's justified reliance led to the detriment, and the
breacher had reason to know that the nonbreacher would reasonably
do so. Because the nonbreacher's detrimental reliance was reasona-
ble,60 we allow reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses. Since the
breacher had reason to know that the nonbreacher would spend
money preparing for performance, it is said that the breacher led
the nonbreacher to the detriment (i.e., the breacher caused the non-
breacher to be injured). Thus, the breacher must repay the non-
breacher for reasonable expenditures. In the house-building exam-
ple, this would be the detriment suffered by the builder who relied
on the homeowner's promise. Thus, if B breaches, A may sue to
recover any expenses incurred in reliance on the contract. These ex-
penses could include such things as building materials and binding
commitments to pay employees or subcontractors.
c. The restitution interest
Like reliance, a restitution interest is protected by seeking to re-
store the injured party to the position it would have been in had it
never entered into the contract. 1 The injured party seeks to be re-
turned to a pre-performance position, as if the failed transaction had
never taken place. What separates the restitution interest from the
reliance interest is that restitution requires that the defendant-
breacher acquire and retain some tangible benefit from the plain-
tiff.62 When this happens, it is said that the defendant has been "un-
justly enriched." Thus it can be said that restitution is often a sub-
category of reliance in that it requires the additional element of
unjust enrichment."
Suppose in the example above that B, homeowner, prevents A,
home builder, from completing the house. A has spent a good deal
of time and money working on B's house; B has a partially built
60. Reasonableness is, of course, a factual question which must be proved to the trier of fact as
a prerequisite for adjudicating the case further.
61. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 55, at 54.
62. Unfortunately, this clear separation of the restitution interest from the reliance interest has
been muddied from the beginning by the working definition of restitution, which states that "[a]
person confers a benefit if he . . . performs services beneficial to or at the request of the other
. .. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. b (1937) (emphasis added). See also Bond v.
Oak Mfg. Co., 293 F.2d 752, 753. (3d Cir. 1961) (using the identical definition).
63. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 55, at 55. Thus, it should be apparent that restitution is the
interest that courts are seeking to protect when they grant a recovery based upon a contract
implied in law. Restitution, however, can also arise in numerous other situations such as torts and
constructive trusts. See I PALMER, supra note 4, at 2-3.
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house on his land born out of A's labor and materials. A is entitled
to restitution because A relied on B's promise to pay and B was
enriched (i.e., B now has A's materials and the fruits of A's labor).
A justifiably relied, and B was unjustly enriched.6 4 To contrast the
restitution interest and the reliance interests in this example, sup-
pose that A had only spent money in loading her trucks and cutting
the wood for B's home and B breached before A ever came over to
do any work - B has not been enriched. B does not have A's mater-
ials or a partially built house. Yet, since A spent money cutting the
wood and loading her trucks, she has still acted to her detriment in
relying on the contract. Here, A's reliance interest must be pro-
tected because, although B never received any benefit from A's ac-
tions, A still acted to her detriment in reasonably relying on B's
failed performance.
The distinctions among the three legal interests are clarified even
further by the assertion that the restitution interest is more entitled
to protection than the reliance interest alone, and that a reliance
interest is more entitled to protection than an expectancy interest.
[T]he "restitution interest" ... presents twice as strong a claim to judicial
intervention as the reliance interest, since if A not only causes B to lose one
unit but appropriates that unit to himself, the resulting discrepancy between
A and B is not one unit but two.
On the other hand, the promisee who has actually relied on the promise,
even though he may not thereby have enriched the promisor [thus only los-
ing his reliance interest], certainly presents a more pressing case for relief
than the promisee who merely demands satisfaction for his disappointment
[i.e., demands satisfaction of the expectancy interest] in not getting what
was promised him. 8
Although such an assertion may be a topic for debate, the distinc-
tions illustrated by this hierarchy help clarify the similarities and
differences among the three interests.
d. Overlap among the interests
It has also been asserted that in some situations restitution and
reliance are not limited merely to putting an injured party in a pre-
64. The added element of A's justifiable reliance in this situation would likely be required in
order to meet the requirement that the enrichment of B was unjust or inequitable. Had B
breached the contract before A began any of the work, and, knowing this to be true, A went
ahead and performed anyway, no recovery could be had in restitution. In this case, B's enrichment
is no longer unjust.
65. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 55, at 56.
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performance position. While restitution can serve to return out-of-
pocket expenses to an injured party, it can, in its real application,
give such injured party more than just his money back; it can give
him something he did not have before.66 This is an indication that
the three interests, reliance, restitution, and expectation, while theo-
retically distinct, are in practice often overlapping."7 For example, if
the client of an accountant or a banker received advice that was the
product of the professional's long hours of research and expertise,
and the client refused to pay, such client would have received the
benefit of free advice. The client has been unjustly enriched at the
professional's expense. Restitution might measure the defendant-cli-
ent's gain by the fair market value of the professional's hours of
service. The fair market value of the plaintiff professional's services
is not limited merely to expenditures; it includes a profit margin.6 8
Reliance, too, might award this accountant or banker plaintiff the
"something extra" of profit, because the advice was given after a
promise to pay, which was relied upon by the accountant or banker.
The reason that the "something extra" of profit is often inter-
jected into recovery based on restitution or reliance is that we some-
times have to go outside the transaction, into the "fair market," to
determine the basis of the nonbreacher's compensation. By going
outside into the realm of the fair market evaluation, we find that
each bidder in this fair market has included a profit margin in her
price, and when we bring this fair market price back into the trans-
action, we bring with it the profit.6 The value of detrimental reli-
66. See id. at 54-55 n.2; I PALMER, supra note 4, at 4; Dale A. Oesterle, Restitution and
Reform, 79 MICH. L. REV. 336, 338 (1980).
67. The overlap between reliance and restitution has been shown. See supra text accompanying
notes 64-65. It is possible to rely on a promise and confer a benefit. But there is a subset of
restitution which is not related to reliance. It is possible to confer a benefit without the presence of
a promise on which to rely (i.e., conferring a benefit without a preceding promise), such as the
case of mistaken performance. There is also overlap between the expectation interest of profit and
the interests of reliance and restitution. The discussion which follows shows that elements of ex-
pectation interest can also creep into an analysis of restitution or reliance.
68. Oesterle, supra note 66, at 345. See also infra text accompanying notes 184-91 (discussing
fair market value in regard to recovery for the nonbreaching party).
69. It is the use of the word "profit" that is causing the confusion. Profit, in the Fuller and
Perdue interest sense, is the plus margin that is expected, the raison d'etre for entering into the
transaction. Fuller and Perdue, supra note 55, at 76. When we speak of the profit included in the
use of fair market value, we are using profit to mean that amount which exceeds expenses. A
builder planning to build a home might have an expectancy interest of 20% (i.e., after adding up
the costs of materials and labor, a 20% figure was added to bid). This 20% was the builder's
"expectancy interest." When we award the builder reliance or restitution damages, we measure
the builder's loss or the homeowner's gain by the fair market value. What we are doing is taking a
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ance also can be measured by an objective market value, and this
value would of necessity include the profit of other available market
prices. In looking to the fair market value to evaluate reliance and
restitution, the fair market price should include some modicum of
profit, that profit that other market participants include in their
pricing.
While the rudimentary explanation and comparison of these inter-
ests are not completed by the preceding paragraphs, this short ex-
planation presents the basic conceptual framework of each interest
and demonstrates that the borderlines that separate them are not
always clear and distinct.
B. Historical Development of Quantum Meruit
The first uses of the term quantum meruit are not at all clear.
While the phrase is certainly Latin in origin, no reference to the
term can be found in works on Roman law. 70 Its use during medie-
val times is especially clouded. Many legal historians imply that it
existed, but they fail to adequately explain the manner in which it
was used.7' It is likely that one of the first uses of quantum meruit
was in the chancery courts. 2 Its utilization in the common law
courts did not occur until at least the sixteenth century. 71 Its subse-
quent development followed the evolution of English contract law,
especially that of the action of assumpsit. As such, it is necessary to
briefly review the history of contract law as it relates to the origins
and development of quantum meruit. 4
1. Medieval Contractual Actions
In the fourteenth century, prior to the development of assumpsit,
the forms of action used in contractual matters were debt, detinue,
fair market profit margin as well. This margin may or may not be coincidental with the builder's
expected 20%. See id. at 73-76.
70. Roman law did, however, recognize quasi-contractual obligations. H.F. JOLOWICZ &
BARRY NICHOLAS. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION T'O THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 284-85 (3d ed.
1972).
71. See, e.g., A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 64 (1975).
72. JAMES B. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 156 (1913). See also BAKER, supra note 15,
at 272 ("Claims were entertained in Chancery for a just reward for services where no certain sum
had been fixed.").
73. SIMPSON, supra note 71, at 65.
74. This discussion will be limited to developments.in the common law, even though equity
courts also offered relief in contractual matters. See id. at 122.
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account, and covenant. 75 Each action had its own factual and proce-
dural prerequisites, which often enough were so complicated and re-
strictive as to leave the injured party effectively with no remedy. 76
The common law courts viewed what we today would consider a
contractual matter as a relationship between two or more parties
where items, or "grants," were exchanged. 7' The idea of the ex-
change of mutual promises coupled with the notion of consideration
did not gain acceptance until after the development and modifica-
tion of assumpsit itself.78
a. Debt
The "oldest and most important" contractual action in the four-
teenth century was the writ of debt.79 Debt, however, was limited to
situations in which either the plaintiff could produce an instrument
under seal, or had given the defendant something.80 Debt did not
concern a promise to pay the creditor; it just covered a relationship
between parties. The relationship created the debt; there was no
promise to pay. 1 With debt there was no question of an undertak-
ing. The relationship sprang from the exchange of "grants," not
promises. 2 Although an exchange of grants hints upon the idea of
consideration in contracts today, there was no element of a promise
according to the common law judges.
The pleading and proof of debt were very difficult. The action
required that a "sum certain" allegedly owed by the defendant to
the plaintiff be pleaded and proven.83 Debt did not exist unless the
exact amount was known and shown. In addition, the action of debt
could be defended by wager of law8" and could not be maintained
75. AMES, supra note 72, at 122.
76. Id.
77. THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 633 (5th ed.
1956).
78. AMES, supra note 72, at 122.
79. PLUCKNETT, supra note 77, at 633.
80. BAKER, supra note 15, at 268-69. In the latter situation, "[a] plaintiff could maintain an
action of debt if he had conferred some valuable recompense, or quid pro quo, upon the defendant
in return for the duty [to pay the debt] . I..." d. at 268.
81. PLUCKNETT, supra note 77, at 363.
82. Id. The "grant" that the debtor gave to the creditor was the debt itself. SIMPSON, supra
note 71, at 80.
83. SIMPSON, supra note 71, at 61.
84. A party defending a debt action by wager of law "would take an oath in open court that he
did not owe the debt, and at the same time bring with him eleven neighbors (called 'compurga-
tors'), who should avow upon their oaths that they believed in their consciences that he said the
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against the survivors of the defendant.8 5
While legal historians seem to agree that quantum meruit had no
place in the action of debt due to the requirement of a sum cer-
tain,86 in some situations this may not have been entirely true.
Simpson states that "so long as the price could be fixed somehow, it
did not have to be fixed by agreement, and in medieval times many
prices were fixed by law independently of agreement; in such cases
the plaintiff could demand the sum due at law."87 While this is not
technically quantum meruit, it is certainly a related concept. Simp-
son also states that the plaintiff could sometimes get away with
pleading a sum certain where none had actually been agreed upon. 8
Finally, as the law of assumpsit evolved in the early seventeenth
century, quantum meruit claims were occasionally allowed in debt
actions where the plaintiff claimed an agreement "to pay a reasona-
ble sum," and then requested a specific amount. 9
b. Covenant
The action of covenant existed at the same time as debt, and was
brought to enforce agreements. 0 By way of this action, the plaintiff
could be compensated for the defendant's nonfeasance, or nonper-
formance, of his covenant.9 1 While covenants may have been closer
to what we view as contracts today, the action became less signifi-
cant once the Royal Courts began to require an instrument under
seal. 2 In addition, subsequent developments in the law of assumpsit
and the use of conditioned bonds made covenant actions rare. 93
truth." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1579 (6th ed. 1990).
85. 2 THOMAS A. STREET, FOUNDATIONS IN LEGAL LIABILITY 61 (1906).
86. See. e.g., SIMPSON, supra note 71, at 64; AMES, supra note 72, at 89.
87. SIMPSON, supra note 71, at 65. A "common labourer's" wages, for example, were set by
law. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 66. As Simpson states, it is not certain whether all courts would permit such plead-
ing. The availability of implied-in-fact and implied-in-law contracts obviates the need for such
false pleading. This could, however, be roughly analogous to a present-day quantum meruit claim
on an express contract. While unusual, it is certainly possible that two parties would expressly
agree that compensation be measured by the amount deserved by the party performing the
services.
90. BAKER, supra note 15, at 264-65.
91. Id. at 266. An action in covenant could not be maintained, however, for an improper per-
formance (misfeasance).
92. PLUCKNETT, supra note 77, at 633-34. This occurred around the beginning of the four-
teenth century. BAKER, supra note 15, at 265.
93. SIMPSON, supra note 71, at 43. A conditioned bond required a party to pay a sum of money
to another unless the former performed as required in the bond. In this manner, a failure to
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c. Account and detinue
The remaining contractual-type actions of account and detinue
were of less significance in the development of contract law than
were debt and covenant. An action in account generally was appli-
cable to only a few types of relationships, such as partners,94 and
required the defendant to render "a reasonable account to the plain-
tiff of money received."9 5 Account, however, did play a role in the
development of quasi-contracts, or contracts implied in law.9" Deti-
nue, on the other hand, was the "twin sister" of debt, and was an
action to recover specific personal property.97
2. The Development of Assumpsit
a. Trespass and trespass on the case
At the beginning of the thirteenth century, there also existed a
system of writs for remedying wrongs known as trespass actions. 98 A
writ of trespass "summoned the defendant to come and explain why
he had done wrong' '9 and in this sense was equivalent to present
day tort actions. Initially the Royal Courts required that the wrong
be done "with force and arms, and against the peace of the lord
King."'0 0 In addition, these general trespass actions were fit into
certain common forms such as assault or the taking of property. The
general formulas soon became insufficient, however, and plaintiffs
were permitted to set forth the unique factual circumstances which
they felt entitled them to relief. 10' Actions styled in this manner
were termed "trespass on the case," and offered a flexible alterna-
tive to the rigid formulas of general trespass. 102
In order to further distinguish general trespass actions from tres-
pass on the case, it has been said that in the former the defendant is
perform as promised was actionable in debt. Id. at 43-44.
94. PLUCKNETT, supra note 77, at 635.
95. BAKER, supra note 15, at 301.
96. Id. at 300.
97. Id. at 267.
98. Id. at 56.
99. Id.
100. SIMPSON, supra note 71, at 202 (translated from the Latin phrase vi et armis, et contra
pacem Domini Regis). This requirement was eventually dropped in the late fourteenth century.
id.
101. BAKER, supra note 15, at 58. There was also no requirement in these actions that the
defendant had acted with force and arms. SIMPSON, supra note 71, at 202-03.
102. BAKER, supra note 15, at 58.
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punished for doing- what he "ought not to have done," while in ac-
tions on the case the defendant "had not done what [he] ought to
have done."103 Thus, actions for trespass on the case were the rough
equivalent of what is now termed a "breach of duty."' 10 4 Because of
this distinction, the medieval courts required that there be some rea-
son why the defendant should have done something (i.e., a duty),
else liability would not attach. At first, a duty was based upon either
law and custom or a previous transaction between the parties.10 5
Eventually this source of duty evolved into "assumpsit," which
meant that the defendant undertook "to do something, and then did
it badly to the damage of the plaintiff."'' 0
A case illustrating this early notion of tort was The Case of the
Humber Ferryman.'07 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a
ferryman, had undertaken to move his horse across a river, but had
overloaded the ferry so much that it overturned and drowned the
plaintiff's horse. Procedurally, the case was a bill of general tres-
pass, but the plaintiff alleged that the ferryman had assumed the
liability for damage.'08 In another case, in 1369, a plaintiff alleged
that the defendant had assumed to cure his sick horse but was so
negligent in his treatment that the horse died. 09 The destruction of
the plaintiffs chattel (horse) was the basis for the trespass, and the
defendant's undertaking to cure the horse was the necessary as-
sumpsit element of the trespass."0
The idea of trespass above involved a "misfeasance" to the plain-
tiff."' The misfeasance was the damage done to the'chattels. In the
case of nonfeasance, however, the common law courts were very re-
luctant to permit trespass actions."12 Since the situation "sounded in
103. SIMPSON, supra note 71, at 204.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 205-07.
106. BAKER, supra note 15, at 274.
107. Bukton v. Townsend, Y.B. 22 Lib. Ass., fo. 94, pl. 41 (K.B. 1348).
108. PLUCKNETT, supra note 77, at 470-71. While the record nowhere contains the term as-
sumpsit and was regarded as a general trespass, the action is generally thought to be an early
example of assumpsit for trespass on the case. One possible reason for the omission of the term
assumpsit was that the ferryman was engaged in a common calling and therefore it was not neces-
sary to plead and prove an actual assumpsit (duty was based upon law and custom). See supra
text accompanying note 105.
109. Waldon v. Marshall, Y.B. 43 Edw. 3, fo. 33, pl. 38 (1369).
110. PLUCKNETT, supra note 77, at 638 (referring to a partial translation of a report in Waldon
v. Marshall, Y.B. 43 Edw. 3, fo. 33, pl. 38 (1369)).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 639.
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covenant," a trespass action could not be maintained, and the plain-
tiff who detrimentally relied on a defendant's future undertaking
was usually without remedy.1"' While the distinction seems harsh,
especially in light of the problems associated with actions in cove-
nant, it nonetheless remained until at least the fifteenth century.114
b. Simple assumpsit
At a time when the common law courts were seeking to gain ju-
risdictional power, there was a strong incentive to extend the action
similar to the trespass-assumpsit to those cases of nonfeasance.11 5
Such an extension was first accomplished by finding another basis
besides nonfeasance alone for the defendant to be held liable."' As
stated previously, courts did not hesitate to impose a duty upon
many of the common callings, such as innkeepers. Thus, the courts
also did not. find it difficult to allow actions in assumpsit where a
member of one of these trades had failed to act as was required
(nonfeasance).117
The principal method by which assumpsit was expanded to in-
clude nonfeasance, however, was the use of deceit. The courts ini-
tially permitted trespass on the case to be brought on the express
warranties of merchants. If the goods did not conform to the quality
levels expressed by the seller, the seller was seen as having deceived
the buyer." 8 Eventually this was extended to the point where failure
to act upon an assumed undertaking constituted a deceit and was
thus actionable in assumpsit."19 One requirement that was imposed
on these actions, however, was that of consideration. In order for the
nonfeasance to become actionable, something more had to be pre-
sent. That is, the plaintiff must have either given the defendant
something in return for the promise, or detrimentally relied on the
defendant's promise. 120 "Simple assumpsit" thus became an action
1I3. BAKER, supra note 15, at 275.
114. Id. at 276-77.
115. PLUCKNETT, supra note 77, at 639.
116. BAKER, supra note 15, at 277.
117. Id. at 277-78. An example would be where an innkeeper refused to give lodging to
someone.
118. PLUCKNETT, supra note 77, at 640-41.
119. Id. at 641-43; BAKER, supra note 15, at 278-89.
120. BAKER, supra note 15, at 280-81. "Assumpsit would lie only upon a promise given for
sufficient consideration. . . . The plaintiff alleged that in consideration of something done by him
for the defendant the defendant promised to do something else, and that the defendant deceitfully
failed to keep his promise." Id. at 281.
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for the nonperformance of a parol or simple contract. 12 1 The notion
supporting the action was still deceit and remained so until the be-
ginning of the seventeenth century, but the basics of modern con-
tract law had begun to emerge.
3. The Emergence of Indebitatus Assumpsit and the Common
Counts
a. Application of assumpsit to a debt: Indebitatus assumpsit
Simple assumpsit was not available to recover a debt even when
the debt arose out of a specific promise to pay.122 As stated previ-
ously, debt only concerned a relationship between the parties.' A
debtor could actually be in debt to someone yet never have made a
promise to pay that debt. Assumpsit was only available for the non-
performance on a simple contract.124 If there was no promise to pay
the debt, there was no assumpsit. In still another attempt to expand
their jurisdiction, the common law courts began to develop a specific
type of assumpsit: indebitatus assumpsit.'11
After it was settled that assumpsit would lie for nonfeasance, the
courts also began to recognize that assumpsit could be used to en-
force a debt if the defendant had made a promise to pay such debt
at the same time or after such debt was created.'2 Such an action
became known as indebitatus assumpsit and originated early in the
sixteenth century. 2 " The existence of the contemporaneous or subse-
quent-to-debt promise was an absolute prerequisite to pleading in-
debitatus assumpsit. 28 In 1532, it was also held that the plaintiff
could elect to bring an action in either indebitatus assumpsit or
debt. 1 29 While many objected to this new remedy, indebitatus as-
sumpsit became a very common action.13 0
121. RESTATEMENT Or RESTITUTION pt. I, introductory note, at 15 (1937). Modern textbooks
refer to this earliest type of assumpsit as "simple" or "special assumpsit." "General assumpsit,"
also known as "implied assumpsit," is the type of assumpsit that existed after the expansion of
indebitatus assumpsit in Slade's Case. See infra text accompanying notes 134-40.
122. 1 PALMER, supra note 4, at 6.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 79-89.
124. 1 PALMER, supra note 4, at 6.
125. BAKER, supra note 15, at 287.
126. Id. at 282-83.
127. Id.
128. AMES, supra note 72, at 92.
129. See SIMPSON, supra note 71, at 628-29 (citing Pickering v. Thoroughgood, B.M. MS.
Hargrave 388 (1533)).
130. BAKER, supra note 15, at 288.
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Toward the end of the sixteenth century, indebitatus assumpsit
was used by some common law courts to enforce a debt, even where
there was no subsequent promise to pay. 3' Most cases decided this
way were reversed by the upper courts until 1602 because they
feared that allowing indebitatus assumpsit to be used in this manner
would negate the whole necessity for the action of debt. 1, 2 But the
desire of the common law courts to expand their jurisdiction won
out in Slade's Case' in 1602.
b. Slade's Case
Slade's Case allowed indebitatus assumpsit to be used to enforce
a debt without proof of a subsequent promise to pay.'13 The assump-
sit itself was presumed: "Every contract executory impacts in itself
an assumpsit, for when one agrees to pay money or to deliver any-
thing, thereby he assumes or promises to pay or deliver it."' 35 Thus,
wherever there was a debt, as defined by the action of debt, a prom-
ise to pay that debt would be implied. That promise could be en-
forced by the action of assumpsit even though the actual promise
was a fiction. 136 Since it was considerably easier to plead and prove,
and still produced the same result as debt, indebitatus assumpsit
soon came to supersede debt. Indebitatus assumpsit could be main-
tained against the survivors of the defendant, was not subject to wa-
ger at law, and the exact amount in question need not have been
known. 37 After the holding in Slade's Case, the deceit basis of in-
debitatus assumpsit began to fade and was replaced by the contrac-
tual element - the "mutual executory agreement of both par-
ties.' 38 As one author has stated, "1602 may be regarded as the
date whence the modern law of contract traces its life as a single
entity."'1 9
Even after Slade's Case, some minor problems still existed. Al-
131. 2 STREET, supra note 85, at 61-62.
132. Id. at 287.
133. 76 Eng. Rep. 1072 (K.B. 1602).
134. Id. The decision in Slade's Case was unique in that a special Exchequer Chamber consist-
ing of all of the judges of England decided the case. While justice may indeed be slow today, the
Exchequer Chamber took over five years to resolve the dispute. BAKER, supra note 15, at 286.
135. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 77, at 646 (citing Slade's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1072 (K.B.
1602)).
136. 2 STREET, supra note 85, at 64-66.
137. PLUCKNETT, supra note 77, at 647-48.
138. Id. at 648.
139. BAKER, supra note 15, at 287.
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though the promise to pay a debt could be implied, the actual debt
had to be proven in order to maintain an action of indebitatus as-
sumpsit. 14° It is at this point that quantum meruit began to emerge.
c. The emergence of quantum meruit and the common counts:
General assumpsit
As stated previously, it was difficult, if not impossible, to base an
action in debt upon quantum meruit.' 4' At first, this same problem
existed for indebitatus assumpsit, since the action was based upon a
debt. Around the time of Slade's Case, courts began to allow quan-
tum meruit counts to be brought in simple assumpsit. These cases
allowed the undertaking, or promise, to be assumed from the cir-
cumstances of the case. 42 This development initially occurred in the
trades of common calling. The quasi-public servant nature of the
trades was an excellent germination ground for novel concepts of
contract. Since the law often imposed certain obligations on these
tradesmen,1  some courts began to feel that the law should also im-
pose upon their customers a promise to pay for the goods or services
that were provided to them. 14 4 In 1609, an innkeeper was allowed to
imply a promise of a guest to pay what was reasonable for the ser-
vices and goods supplied.1 4 5 Numerous other cases soon followed,
and the notion of an implied-in-fact contract was firmly estab-
lished. 146 A request for services without any agreement as to what
the compensation would be gave rise to a quantum meruit claim in
assumpsit.
While the above mentioned development of implied-in-fact con-
140. Id.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 79-89.
142. BAKER, supra note 15, at 305.
143. See supra text accompanying note 116-17.
144. AMES, supra note 72, at 154.
145. Warbrook v. Griffin, 123 Eng. Rep. 927 (C.P. 1609). "[I]t is an implied promise of every
part, that is, of the part of the inn-keeper, and he shall preserve the goods of his guest, and of the
part of the guest, that he will pay all duties and charges, which he caused in the house. ... Id.
at 928. Ames states that this was the first recognition of a quantum mecruit claim, however this
has not been satisfactorily shown. See AMES, supra note 72, at 154.
146. AMES, supra note 72, at 156. Many authors see this as one of the starting points for quasi-
contracts, that is contracts implied in law, and this is undoubtedly true. However, they fail to
point out that these are really contracts implied in fact. The presence of a consensual transaction
gives rise to an implied-in-fact contract. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39. Indeed, it is
difficult to determine exactly when the courts crossed over the line from implied-in-fact to im-
plied-in-law contracts, and this probably played a role in the resulting confusion that still exists
today.
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tracts was occurring, it came to pass that pleading in indebitatus
assumpsit required only that the plaintiff "allege the general nature
of the indebtedness . . and that defendant being so indebted prom-
ised to pay.' ' 7 This mode of pleading was the origin of the common
counts. 4 8 "Work and labor done at defendant's request" is an early
form of quantum meruit, and the form of pleading is essentially the
same. 49 By the latter part of the seventeenth century the courts be-
gan to allow claims to be brought in indebitatus assumpsit for im-
plied-in-fact contracts by relaxing the required proof of the debt,
and indebitatus assumpsit could be used for quantum meruit
claims. 5 ' This form of assumpsit has been referred to as general
assumpsit so as to distinguish it from earlier forms of assumpsit.15 '
At this point the development of quantum meruit was complete, at
least as far as express and implied-in-fact contracts were concerned.
The only remaining step was the development of contracts implied
in law.
4. The Origins of Contracts Implied in Law
Regardless of the terminology, the action of general assumpsit
arose and expanded along with the notion of quasi-contract. 152 The
equitable nature of the new common law legal actions, such as gen-
eral assumpsit and all its tributaries such as indebitatus assumpsit
and quantum meruit, reflected the common law courts' efforts to
move into the Chancellor's equitable territory.'53 Over the next few
centuries, a detailed system developed of awarding restitution in
147. AMES, supra note 72, at 153-54, The allegations could be, for example, "for goods sold,
money lent, money paid at the defendant's request, money had and received to the plaintiff's use,
work and labor at the defendant's request, or upon an account stated." Id. at 154.
148. Id. at 153. The common counts were certain standard forms of pleading in assumpsit.
They included claims "for 'money had and received'; 'money paid for the benefit of the defend-
ant'; 'goods sold and delivered'; 'land occupied and used'; 'work and labor performed (Quantum
Meruit)'; and the 'value of the product (Quantum Valebant).' " JOHN F. O'CONNELL, REMEDIES
IN A NUTSHELL 76 (2d ed. 1985). Today, quantum valebant is often considered to be a form of
quantum meruit.
149. 2 STREET, supra note 85, at 185-86.
150. SIMPSON, supra note 71, at 499. Presumably, a similar action could be brought on an
express contract.
151. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION pt. 1, introductory note, at 15 (1937); 1 PALMER, supra
note 4, at 7. The terms general assumpsit and indebitatus assumpsit are somewhat synonymous.
Although modern use of the terms has indebitatus as only a type of general assumpsit, indebitatus
assumpsit was the most commonly used form of general assumpsit, and it is often used in place of
general assumpsit to describe those post-Slade fictitious promise assumpsits.
152. JOHN P. DAWSON & GEORGE E. PALMER, CASES ON RESTITUTION 4 (2d ed. 1969).
153. Id.
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cases where neither tort nor contract necessarily existed.15
While a detailed discussion of those cases in which the courts es-
sentially allowed recovery on a contract implied in law will not be
attempted, it is fairly clear that the first forays into implied-in-law
contracts occurred in the common count for money had And re-
ceived. 155 Many such actions could be maintained in account, and
debt was a concurrent remedy if the plaintiff could establish a sum
certain.' 56 Following the result in Slade's Case, some courts allowed
indebitatus assumpsit actions to be brought in these cases because of
an implied promise to pay the debt. Thus in 1657, a recovery in
indebitatus assumpsit was permitted where the plaintiff had mistak-
enly paid a certain sum of money to the defendant. 57 From this
humble beginning, general assumpsit was permitted in numerous sit-
uations that can be characterized as contracts implied in law. 5 8 The
problem was that these cases were hopelessly confused with actions
that we would today consider to be contracts implied in fact, which
caused some judges to disagree with the notion that indebitatus as-
sumpsit would lie where there was no consensual transaction. 59
Lord Mansfield, the great eighteenth-century jurist who invented
"holder in due course,""' e is generally seen as the savior of contracts
implied in law. He explained these new developments in terms of
their restitutionary nature and found a basis for implied-in-law con-
tracts in Roman law: "If the defendant be under an obligation, from
the ties of natural justice, to refund; the law implies a debt, and
gives this action, founded in the equity of the plaintiff's case, as it
were upon a contract ('quasi ex contractu,' as the Roman law ex-
presses it)."''
The gist of this kind of action is that the defendant, upon the
circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice
and equity to refund the money.
With this broadening of the scope of assumpsit came a blurring of
the remedies and forms of pleading. The old forms of pleading (i.e.,
154. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES 235 (1973).
155. BAKER, supra note 15, at 307-12.
156. AMES, supra note 72, at 163. "If, for example, the money was to be applied in payment of
a debt erroneously supposed to be due from the plaintiff to the defendant . . . the plaintiff would
recover the money in account." Id.
157. Bonnel v. Foulke, 82 Eng. Rep. 1224 (K.B. 1657).
158. I PALMER, supra note 4, at 7.
159. SIMPSON, supra note 71, at 505.
160. See Miller v. Race, 97 Eng. Rep. 398, 401-02 (K.B. 1758).
161. Moses v. MacFerlan, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760).
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the common counts) were essentially available in all types of actions
in assumpsit. Thus, quantum meruit, one of the six common counts,
applied to any indebtedness for work performed, whether based on
express, implied-in-fact, or implied-in-law contracts. Lord Mansfield
was probably well ahead of his time, at least in England. While the
actions such as indebitatus assumpsit, debt, and account were abol-
ished in England in 1852 for a much simpler method of pleading,
contracts implied in law were disfavored in England well into the
twentieth century. 6 ' The situation was different, however, in the
United States, and contracts implied in law developed along with
the law of restitution.
While this brief history of quantum meruit is by no means com-
plete, the foregoing should impress upon the reader the confusion
that has persisted for over four hundred years. Some of the termi-
nology and principles are still basically the same today as they were
at the end of the seventeenth century in England. Regrettably, so is
some of the confusion.
The following chart approximates some of the major dates:
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C. Quantum Meruit As It Has Evolved Into the Twentieth
Century
As stated previously, the term quantum meruit literally means
"as much as is deserved" and is utilized to secure compensation for
work and labor performed. 63 Recoveries in quantum meruit gener-
ally occur in three situations: implied-in-fact contracts, implied-in-
law contracts, and as an alternative contract remedy upon a breach
or repudiation of an express contract. 164 While the terminology may
be the same, the rules regarding each situation are not. As such, a
determination of what the proper recovery should be in a particular
case will often hinge upon the categorization of the claim.
1. Express and Implied-in-Fact Contracts
The original application of quantum meruit was in the sphere of
express and implied-in-fact contracts.' 65 As previously discussed, an
express contract is based upon a written or oral agreement, and an
implied-in-fact contract is inferred from the conduct of the par-
ties. "6 Any express or implied-in-fact contract involving services
usually requires that one party has requested some performance by
the other party," 7 and an action in quantum meruit will only lie
when both parties agreed (express contract) or expected (implied-in-
fact contract) that the performing party would be paid the reasona-
ble value, as opposed to a specified rate, of the services rendered.' 68
Thus, if either party reasonably believed that the work was being
performed gratuitously or because of some duty to do so, without
any expectation of compensation, there can be no quantum recovery
on an express or implied-in-fact contract since no contract has been
163. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1243 (6th ed. 1990). Some courts also apply the term to
claims for the value of goods, which is technically quantum valebant. The two modes of recovery,
however, generally follow the same principles.
164. ROSETT, supra note 32, at 340-41.
165. Candace S. Kovacik, A Proposal to Simplify Quantum Meruit Litigation, 35 AM. U. L.
REv. 547, 554 (1986). See also supra text accompanying notes 141-51 (discussing the history of
quantum meruit).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
167. Kovacik, supra note 165, at 555. It is also possible to have an implied-in-fact contract
where one party accepts the performance of the other, without having requested the work, and the
party accepting knows that the other will demand payment.
168. Id. at 556. As was stated in the historical section, a recovery in quantum meruit on an
express contract is rare. It is more often the case that one party has merely requested the services
of the other, having never discussed any specific price for the work, and has the expectation that
the ultimate "bill" would be for some reasonable sum.
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formed.
The amount of a quantum meruit recovery on an express or im-
plied-in-fact contract is generally measured by the fair market value
of the work performed, since this is considered to be the reasonable
value of the services.' 69 Both parties are assumed to have agreed
that this would be the reasonable value of the one party's perform-
ance, 170 although they certainly may differ as to what the fair mar-
ket value actually is. In this regard, a recovery in quantum meruit
on an express or implied-in-fact contract is not restitutionary, rather
it is compensatory. That is, the court attempts to compensate the
plaintiff for the damages he has suffered from the defendant's fail-
ure to perform. Thus, the recovery protects either the plaintiff's ex-
pectancy or reliance interests. 171
2. Implied-in-Law Contracts
The second area in which recoveries in quantum meruit arise is
that of implied-in-law contracts, or quasi-contracts. While the ter-
minology may cause some confusion, an action on an implied-in-law
contract is a purely restitutionary claim. 172 An obligation arises
"without reference to the assent of the obligor, from the receipt of a
benefit the retention of which is unjust, and requiring the obligor to
make restitution."'1 3
An implied-in-law contract can arise in numerous situations in
which a quantum meruit recovery may be appropriate. For example,
services may be performed under the mistaken belief that one had a
duty to do so, or they might be rendered pursuant to a contract later
found to be invalid (e.g., because an agent's authority to bind the
principal was lacking). 174 While the variety of situations is endless,
the essential element remains the same - one party has been un-
justly enriched at the expense of another.
Recovery in quantum meruit on an implied-in-law contract is
measured by the amount the party to be charged has benefittedY'75
169. See ROSET-r, supra note 32, at 340; Kovacik, supra note 165, at 556.
170. Kovacik, supra note 165, at 556.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 55-69 (discussing the three interests courts seek to
protect: expectancy, reliance, and restitution).
172. ROSETT, supra note 32, at 341.
173. WOODWARD, supra note 40, at 4.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 5. ("[T]he obligee shall be compensated, not for any loss or damage suffered by
him, but for the benefit which he has conferred upon the obligor.").
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The focus is not on the performing party but rather is on the person
receiving the benefit of the services and what the receiving party has
actually gained. While this differs from the recovery under an ex-
press or implied-in-fact contract, under some circumstances the re-
sult obtained is the same. If the receiving party actually requested
that the services be performed, the benefit he has gained can be
appropriately measured by the fair market value of the services.17 6
"[T]he defendant has received something desired by him, and the
question whether he is thereby enriched in estate is irrelevant.' 1 7 In
this regard, use of the word "benefit" is more appropriate than "en-
richment," 178 although "unjust enrichment" seems to be the com-
monly used phrase in restitution. In most other situations, however,
the proper remedy is the amount of the defendant's enrichment (i.e.,
economic gain), as difficult a determination as that may be.
3. Quantum Meruit as an Alternative Contract Remedy
The final application of quantum meruit is as an alternative con-
tract remedy. Upon the repudiation or breach of a contract (express
or implied-in-fact), both the nonbreaching as well as the breaching
party may recover in quantum meruit. 179 While many authors make
a solid distinction between the two situations, it probably makes
more sense to consider them together under their own separate
headings."18
a. Recovery by a nonbreaching party
When a valid, enforceable contract has been repudiated or
breached, the nonbreacher may elect to recover in restitution as op-
posed to recovering actual damages. 181 This result arose from the
courts "pretending that every contract included a fictional promise
176. Id. at 9; Kovacik, supra note 165, at 557.
177. WOODWARD, supra note 40, at 9. See also infra text accompanying notes 186-91 (discuss-
ing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371 (1981) as its provisions are also pertinent
to this question).
178. WOODWARD, supra note 40, at 9.
179. ROSETT, supra note 32, at 341.
180. Woodward, for example, treats a recovery by the breacher as purely quasi-contractual.
However, he feels that a recovery by the nonbreacher is not. WOODWARD. supra note 40, at 264-
65, 410-11. While this may be a topic for debate, whether or not the latter situation is an implied-
in-law contract is not of great importance to the present discussion.
181. See Petropoulos v. Lubienski, 152 A.2d 801 (Md. 1959) for an example of such an elec-
tion. In a suit for actual damages, a suit "on the contract," the nonbreacher seeks to protect his
expectancy or reliance interest. See supra text accompanying notes 55-69.
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that if the contract were breached, the breacher would pay the value
of any performance rendered by the nonbreacher."' 182 In this regard,
the nonbreacher "may elect to disregard his contract . . . and de-
mand restitution in value for what he has done. '183
The nonbreaching party who has rendered a past performance is
able to elect a remedy; the election is between a suit on the contract
or a suit in quantum meruit. Naturally, nonbreaching parties will
elect quantum meruit only when it results in a greater recovery than
a suit on the contract. In other words, quantum meruit will be
elected when the deal struck is a losing deal for the nonbreaching
party.
A quantum meruit recovery elected by a nonbreacher will usually
be the reasonable (fair market) value of the services performed
under the contract."" In this sense, the fair market value means the
price that the breaching party would have had to pay someone else
to do the same work.185 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
however, merely provides that the recovery can be either the fair
market value of the services8 6 or the amount by which the
breacher's property has been enriched ("or his other's interests ad-
vanced").187 As has been stated, the nonbreaching party would elect
the quantum meruit recovery only when it results in a greater recov-
ery than a suit on the contract. Quantum meruit will be elected
when the deal struck is a losing one for the nonbreaching party, that
is, where the recovery of the expectation damage of profit is not
feasible. While no indication is given in the Restatement as to how
the court should make the choice between the two measurements of
quantum meruit recovery, the comments to section 371 indicate that
the breacher should disgorge the benefit of receiving something that
he desired. 88 In addition, although the price specified in the con-
182. ROSETT, supra note 32, at 341.
183. WOODWARD, supra note 40, at 411.
184. Kovacik, supra note 165, at 564; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371 cmt. b,
illus. 1 (1981).
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371(a) (1981).
186. Id. § 371(a).
187. Id. § 371(b).
188. Id. § 371 cmts. a & b. Comment b states that the non-breacher should usually be able to
recover the greater of the two measurements; however, the fair market value of the services will
almost always be at least equivalent to, if not greater than, the amount the breacher has been
enriched. In any event, the fair market value of the services is usually the proper measure of
recovery except in unique circumstances. One commentator states that under English law the fair
market value is normally the device used to determine quantum meruit recoveries. The exception
would be "that where services are of such a nature that their remuneration would usually depend
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tract may serve as a guide in determining the reasonable value of
the services rendered, it generally acts as no limit on the non-
breacher's recovery. 189 To hold otherwise would place a breacher in
a better position than she would have been in had she fully per-
formed under the contract. An important limitation, however, is
that a recovery in quantum meruit (or restitution) will not be per-
mitted when the nonbreacher has "fully performed" her contractual
duties. 9" The contract price is considered a liquidated debt, and the
nonbreacher may not claim that her services were worth more than
what she originally agreed to.''
b. Recovery by a breaching party
A breaching party may also have a remedy in quantum meruit
against a nonbreacher. If the nonbreacher has retained some benefit
from the breacher's partial performance (e.g., a partially completed
home), the breaching party may recover in quantum meruit the
value conferred on the nonbreacher minus any damages incurred by
the nonbreacher because of the breach. 92 The measurement of the
value conferred upon the nonbreacher will almost always be the ac-
tual benefit retained by the nonbreacher, since the party seeking the
recovery is at fault.19 3 A further limitation on the breaching party's
recovery is that she will not "be allowed to recover more than a
ratable portion of the total contract price where such a portion can
be determined.' 94 Thus, a breaching party is not permitted to re-
cover more than she could have had she fully performed. Finally,
the breach must not have been a willful one in the majority of
jurisdictions.95
on the result achieved, remuneration on a quantum meruit claim may take into account the de-
gree of benefit conferred on the defendant." MUNKMAN, supra note 2, at 97.
189. WOODWARD, supra note 40, at 430. Keep in mind that in many circumstances the fair
market value of particular work may be difficult to measure. For example, if the breacher has a
house that is half-completed, measurement of the fair market value of the nonbreacher's services
may be difficult without resorting to some pro-rated portion of the total contract price (assuming,
of course, that the original contract price was comparable to what other builders charge). Also, a
nonbreaching party still has a right to recover compensatory damages, and in this example a
reliance or expectancy interest may provide a greater recovery.
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373(2) (1981). Some commentators have dis-
agreed with the logic behind this, and the rule is not a part of English law. See Heyman v.
Darwins, A.C. 356 (1942).
191. Oliver v. Campbell, 273 P.2d 15 (Cal. 1955).
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 374 (1981); Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481
(1834).
193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 374 cmt. b (1981).
194. Id.
195. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO. THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 477 (3d ed. 1987).
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II. DIVERGENCES FROM THE NORM: UNIQUE APPLICATIONS OF
QUANTUM MERUIT
While the previous discussion is an accurate description of how
most courts should and do deal with quantum meruit claims, there
are times when these rules do not hold true. It must be remembered
that quantum meruit can often be seen as a legal form of equitable
restitution, and as such, certain notions of fairness often enter the
picture. Numerous situations may occur where public policy or sim-
ply the equities of the case play a significant role in the court's deci-
sion. Caution must be maintained, however, when reviewing a par-
ticular court's ruling, since many times a divergence from the norm
has more to do with the court's misunderstanding of the principles
rather than public policy or fairness.
A. Physicians' Recovery of Fees from Patients
One area in which a consistent body of distinct rules has devel-
oped is physicians' recoveries in quantum meruit. Under English
common law physicians were not permitted to bring suit to recover
their fees.' 96 This rule was rejected early on in the United States;19 7
however, a modified form of recovery has emerged.
Rarely does a patient enter into an express contract with his or
her doctor. Usually an implied-in-fact contract will exist based upon
the patient's request for the physician's services and the physician's
acceptance of the patient."9 8 Fees are usually not discussed, and the
196. Chorley v. Bolcot, 100 Eng. Rep. 1040 (K.B. 1791). "[T]he fees of a physician are honor-
ary, and not demandable of right; and it is much more for the credit and rank of that honourable
body, and perhaps for their benefit also, that they should be so considered." Id. at 1041.
197. Pynchon v. Brewster, Quincy 224 (Mass. 1766); Judah v. M'Namee, 3 Blackf. 269 (Ind.
1833).
198. Spencer v. West, 126 So. 2d 423, 426 (La. Ct. App. 1960).
An action to recover for medical services rendered is, of course, predicated upon the
obligation of the patient to pay and arises ex contractu. The relationship between the
physician and patient may result from an express or implied contract, either general
or special, and the rights and liabilities of the parties thereto are governed by the
general law of contract. Where the terms of the contract, especially as to considera-
tion, have not been predetermined, an agreement therefor will be implied and the
doctor is entitled to recover for his services in the same manner as any other person
who performs services for another.
Id. See also Osborne v. Frazor, 425 S.W.2d 768 (Tenn. App. 1968); Garrey v. Stadler, 30 N.W.
787 (Wis. 1886).
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patient assumes that the bill will be reasonable in relation to the
services provided. The normal quantum meruit recovery on an im-
plied-in-fact contract is the fair market value of the services pro-
vided, 199 which in this case would simply be what similar physicians
in the same geographical area charge for the like services.200 Courts,
however, will usually consider other factors in determining what a
reasonable fee might be, 0 1 and they may even take the patient's
ability to pay into account.20 2
With regard to contracts implied in law, a more significant differ-
ence exists for physicians recovering fees. Suppose, for example,
that an unconscious accident victim is taken to the local hospital
where surgery is performed. It would be impossible for an express or
implied-in-fact contract to exist since the victim is unable to give
any manifestation of assent. However, the principles of contracts
implied in law more than adequately cover such a situation, and the
victim will be required to pay for the services.203
It should be obvious that a slightly different approach must be
taken for quantum meruit recoveries on these implied-in-law con-
tracts. Under the previously outlined rules regarding quantum me-
ruit, the patient would only be liable for the actual enrichment re-
ceived. But how can this be adequately measured? If the surgeon
199. See supra text accompanying notes 184-87.
200. 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, Etc. § 388 (1981).
201. Spencer, 126 So. 2d at 426. These factors include: "custom, the nature of the case, the
amount of attention given, professional standing and skill, the end result obtained, the financial
condition of the patient, and anything else which tends to increase the burden of the services
performed by the physician." Id.
202. In re McKeehan's Estate, 57 A.2d 907, 909 (Pa. 1948). But see Cotnam v. Wisdom, 104
S.W. 164, 166 (Ark. 1907) ("IThe financial condition of a patient cannot be considered where
there is no contract and recovery is sustained on a legal fiction which raises a contract in order to
afford a remedy which the justice of the case requires.").
203. See Cotnam, 104 S.W. at 165; Nursing Care Servs., Inc. v. Dobos, 380 So. 2d 516, 518
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). It should also be noted that a bystander who summons medical aid for
an injured person will not be liable for the services provided, unless of course there is an express
promise to do so or a duty to pay is imposed by law (e.g., a parent requesting services for her
child). In most situations, a request for services, even if the ultimate beneficiary is a third party,
will obligate the requesting party to pay for the services. The obligation in this case can be based
on either an implied-in-fact or an implied-in-law contract, the "benefit" for the latter being the
performance of the obligor's request. See, e.g., Earhart v. William Low Co., 600 P.2d 1344 (Cal.
1979). When one requests medical services for an injured third party, the requestor would gener-
ally lack the necessary intent to create an implied-in-fact contract. More importantly, however, a
court will not find an implied-in-law contract because public policy demands that persons not be
discouraged in any way from seeking aid for the injured. See, e.g., Cleveland Anesthesia Group v.
Krulak, 135 N.E.2d '685, 687 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956); Skelly Oil Co. v. Medical & Surgical Clinic,
418 S.W.2d 574, 577 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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saves the patient's life, the absurdity of an enrichment standard be-
comes even clearer.20 4 Because of this, it has been universally held
that the physician's recovery in these cases should also be the rea-
sonable or fair market value of the services rendered, subject to the
same methods of determination as before.205
While the divergences from the norm that exist with regard to
physicians recovering in quantum meruit are minor and easily un-
derstood, they indicate some of the problems that courts face when
dealing with quantum meruit claims. In other situations, the resolu-
tion of these problems becomes more difficult, and courts vary in
their results. Public policy and notions of fairness, as well as other
legal principles, may go in opposite directions, thereby requiring a
delicate balancing. Such is the case in the areas of government con-
tracts, "palimony," and attorneys' fees. The special relationships be-
tween the parties in these cases inevitably lead to modification and
diversity in the application of quantum meruit.
B. The Application of Quantum Meruit When Discharged
Lawyers Sue Clients under Contingency Fee Agreements
Another area in which the normal rules of quantum meruit have
been distorted concerns discharged attorneys seeking to recover fees
based upon a contingency fee contract.20 6 The use of contingency fee
agreements has at times been heralded and at other times criti-
cized.20 7 The application of quantum meruit to these situations has
likewise produced varying results. Notions of public policy and fair-
ness do not lead to one particular conclusion, and selecting the
proper approach depends upon whose interests are to receive the
most protection.
204. Equally absurd would be the case in which the patient dies despite the efforts of the physi-,
cian. Absent malpractice, the physician should be able to recover for the work performed. To do
otherwise would discourage physicians from treating the gravely ill.
205. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., Inc. v. Sales, 346 S.E.2d 212, 214 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
206. While this section is limited to a discussion of contingency fee agreements, problems also
exist when attorneys seek to recover under noncontingent fee agreements or no agreement at all.
For discussions of these two situations, see generally Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Comment
Note: Amount of Attorneys' Compensation in Absence of Contract or Statute Fixing Amount, 57
A.L.R.3D 475 (1974) and V. Woerner, Annotation, Measure or Basis of Attorney's Recovery on
Express Contract Fixing Noncontingent Fees, Where He is Discharged Without Cause or Fault
on His Part, 54 AL.R.2D 604 (1957).
207. See, e.g., Contingency Fees: Three American Lawyers Speak Their Minds, LAW INST. J.,
Dec. 1988, at 1180.
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1. Lawyers Discharged with Cause
Most of the problems in the attorney fee area can be traced to the
fact that a client has the absolute right to discharge her lawyer at
any time, with or without cause."' When the lawyer is discharged
with cause, the only possible means of recovery by the lawyer is in
quantum meruit.2 °9 A discharge with cause essentially amounts to a
breach by the lawyer, not the client, and any recovery of fees by the
lawyer should equal the reasonable value of the services the client
received, offset, of course, by any damages caused by the lawyer.210
Determining that reasonable value can be difficult, as many factors
will be relevant. This determination will generally follow that used
when the discharge is without cause;2 11 however, the fact that the
client had good cause to discharge an attorney will almost certainly
become a prominent factor. It must be noted that at least one juris-
diction has consistently denied any recovery by an attorney who has
been discharged with cause.212
2. Lawyers Discharged without Cause
a. Traditional rule: Recovery under the terms of the contract
The situation becomes clouded when the client discharges the at-
torney without cause. This may occur, for example, when the client
simply loses confidence in the attorney. Under traditional contract
law, such a discharge would constitute a breach by the client, ena-
bling the attorney to recover damages based upon the express terms
208. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 cmt. 4 (1990). "A client has a right
to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the
lawyer's services." Id.
209. 7A C.JS. Attorney & Client § 290 (1980).
210. Rocha v. Ahmad, 676 S.W.2d 149, 156 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). "If the former client pleads
and proves good cause for discharge, . . . the attorney is not entitled to recover under the contract
of employment. In such a case, the attorney may attempt to recover a fee for services rendered up
to the time of discharge under quantum meruit." Id. See also Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 13
(Cal. 1972) (en banc) (stating that an attorney discharged with or without cause is entitled to
receive the reasonable value of services rendered at the time of discharge); Fox & Assocs. v.
Purdon, 541 N.E.2d 448, 450 (Ohio 1989) (asserting that quantum meruit does not create a
threat that a discharged attorney will not be compensated for services rendered before discharge).
Note that this follows the previously discussed general quantum meruit rules. See supra text ac-
companying notes 192-95.
211. See infra text accompanying notes 264-75 for a discussion of how courts determine a
reasonable fee in quantum meruit for attorneys discharged without cause.
212. Teichner v. W & J Holsteins, Inc. 478 N.E.2d 177, 178 (N.Y. 1985). No rationale, such
as breach of fiduciary duty, was given by the court in this case.
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of the contingent fee contract.2 13 While this contract-based recovery
has been labeled the "traditional rule, ' 2 14 today it is recognized by
only a small minority of jurisdictions. 5 This traditional mode of
compensation follows closely basic contract law, but many commen-
tators and judges have failed to discuss adequately the reasoning
behind applying it.2 18
One of the most thoughtful approaches to using the traditional
rule appears to be that of the Idaho Supreme Court in Anderson v.
Gailey.2  The facts in Anderson were rather straightforward: Attor-
ney One was hired on a contingent fee basis (40%); Attorney One
succeeded in obtaining a judgment which was later reversed; while
preparing for a second trial, Attorney One was discharged without
cause; Attorney Two then obtained a favorable settlement. 28  The
sole issue before the court concerned the compensation of the two
attorneys involved in the case.
In ruling that Attorney One was entitled to damages for the for-
mer client's breach, the court in Anderson stated:
[T]he purpose of awarding damages for breach of contract is to fully recom-
pense the non-breaching party for its losses sustained because df the breach,
not to punish the breaching party. Application of this principle of course
requires that the court in fixing damages account for the savings which in-
ure to the non-breaching party because he is relieved of his duty to perform
by the breach. 19
In the context of a breach of contract for personal services, this rule enti-
tles the wrongfully discharged employee or agent to recover the contract
price diminished by the expenses saved and by the amount he received or
could have earned from other suitable employment available because of his
discharge.2 0
We are mindful that the client must be free to retain counsel whom he
trusts and in whom he has confidence and to discharge an attorney with
213. Tonn v. Reuter, 95 N.W.2d 261, 265 (Wis. 1959).
214. Louis A. Etoch, Note, Henry, Walden & Davis v. Goodman: The Value of a Discharged
Attorney's Contingent Fee Contract in Arkansas, 42 ARK. L. REv. 549, 551 (1989).
215. See, e.g., Lockley v. Easley, 786 S.W.2d 573 (Ark. 1990); Anderson v. Gailey, 606 P.2d
90 (Idaho 1980); Waiters v. Hastings, 500 P.2d 186 (N.M. 1972); White v. American Law Book
Co., 233 P. 426 (Okla. 1924); Crawford v. Logan, 656 S.W.2d 360 (Tenn. 1983); Knoll v. Klatt,
168 N.W.2d 555 (Wis. 1969).
216. See, e.g., Michael L. Closen & Zachary A. Tobin, The Contingent Contingency Fee Ar-
rangement: Compensation of the Contingency Fee Attorney Discharged by the Client, 76 ILL. B.J.
916 (1987).
217. 606 P.2d 90 (Idaho 1980).
218. Id. at 91.
219. Id. at 95.
220. Id. The deduction for other compensation that was received or could have been received
does not follow general contract principles. See infra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
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whom he is dissatisfied. But we do not believe that these interests and con-
siderations preclude the application of basic principles of contract law.22" '
While such a determination may seem difficult, the court neverthe-
less remanded the case for a proper determination of damages.222
The Idaho court erred in two ways. First, it misstated the applica-
ble rule for avoidable consequences for discharged attorneys. An at-
torney who has been discharged by a client should not be required
to subtract the profit earned on the next client from the profit she
would have made on the first client. The rule for independent con-
tractors should have been used rather than the rule for personal ser-
vants.22 An attorney has the capacity to pursue the cases of many
clients at the same time.224
The second error of the Idaho court was not anticipating the
change in position that other state supreme courts would take when
faced with the conflict between an attorney's contractual right to
damages and a client's absolute right to discharge a lawyer at any
time, which is preserved in the Canons of Ethics and Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct.225 If a discharged attorney is permitted to re-
cover under the terms of the contract, it should be apparent that the
client may be forced to pay two contingent fees.226 While the deduc-
221. Anderson, 606 P.2d at 95.
222, Id. at 96. The court did not consider the compensation of Attorney Two, since the client
and Attorney Two had agreed that the compensation would be the stipulated contingent fee minus
whatever Attorney One was awarded. Id. at n.5. Likewise, the court did not decide whether a
discharged attorney could elect a quantum meruit recovery. Id. at n.6.
223, The attorney should be treated as an independent contractor with multiple capacity, and
not as a personal services employee who would have the standard mitigation duty. See generally
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 195, §§ 14-16 (discussing mitigation in the context of indepen-
dent contractors); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. d, illus. 10 (1981) (same).
The Anderson court is the only one to insist on such a deduction; others merely require a deduc-
tion for any expenses saved. See, e.g., Tonn v. Reuter, 95 N.W.2d 261, 265 (Wis. 1959) (holding
that damages should amount to the contingent fee "less a fair allowance for the services and
expenses which would necessarily have been expended by the discharged attorney in performing
the balance of the contract").
224. An "in-house" attorney, one whose services are rendered exclusively for one client, would
be an exception to this general proposition. Such an "in-house" attorney would be considered a
personal services employee, and, if fired, would be required to seek other employment or have the
earnings from such available substitute employment subtracted from any damages from the com-
pany which fired him. See generally CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 195, §§ 14-16 (discussing
mitigation in the context of personal services employees).
225. See supra note 210.
226. See, e.g., Salopek v. Schoemann, 124 P.2d 21 (Cal. 1942). "The client may frequently be
forced to choose between continuing the employment of an attorney in whom he has lost faith, or
risking the payment of double contingent fees equal to the greater portion of any amount eventu-
ally recovered." Id. at 25 (Gibson, C.J., concurring). See also Jones v. Brown, 190 P.2d 956 (Cal.
App. 1948) (allowing a discharged attorney to recover one-third of the client's recovery after
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tion of expenses saved might be a possible way to lessen the first
attorney's recovery, many courts have concluded that the possibility
of a double contingency fee has the effect of discouraging clients
from exercising.their right to discharge their attorney.2 7 As the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court noted:
The relationship between the attorney and his client must be based upon the
utmost trust and confidence, and if that basis has been substantially under-
mined, the relationship should be terminated. . . . It would be an injustice
to the client to hold him liable for both contingency fees for exercising that
fundamental right.228
Indeed, this is precisely what has caused most jurisdictions to per-
mit only recovery on a quantum meruit basis.229 It is interesting to
note that many of the courts that have recently upheld recoveries of
the contingent fee by the discharged attorney have not dealt with
the prospect of a large, double recovery.230 Those that have been
faced with such a problem have generally succumbed to the newly
emerging majority rule.23'
One very notable exception to the trend toward permitting law-
yers discharged without cause to recover only on a quantum meruit
basis is the state of Arkansas. In 1987, the Arkansas Supreme
Court reversed its earlier decisions on the issue and decided to fol-
low the trend by rejecting the traditional rule of permitting recov-
eries under the terms of a contingency fee contract. 32 The court's
reasoning was quoted above,2 3  and its decision was not at all unex-
pected. The Arkansas legislature, however, disagreed and adopted
Act 293 of 1989,234 which expressly overturned the court's deci-
second attorney had been paid 40%).
227. See, e.g., Salopek, 124 P.2d. at 25.
228. Henry, Walden & Davis v. Goodman, 741 S.W.2d 233, 236 (Ark. 1987).
229. See, e.g., id.; Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972) (en banc); Rosenberg v. Levin,
409 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1982); Rhoades v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 399 N.E.2d 969 (I1. 1979).
230. For example, see Anderson v. Gailey, 606 P.2d 90, 91 (Idaho 1980), where the second
attorney agreed to divide the fee with the discharged attorney; Walters v. Hastings, 500 P.2d 186
(N.M. 1972), in which there was a settlement of claim after discharge without the use of second
attorney; Adams v. Mellen, 618 S.W.2d 485 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981), in which the court never
discussed compensation of second attorney; and Tonn v. Reuter, 95 N.W.2d 261, 266 (Wis. 1959),
where the court said that the payment of a second attorney was not an issue on appeal.
231. See, e.g., Fox & Assocs. v. Purdon, 541 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio 1989) (stating that the "tradi-
tional rule" would have lead to attorney's fees of more than $8,000 out of an $11,500 settlement).
232. Henry, Walden & Davis, 741 S.W.2d at 236.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 219-21.
234. 1989 Ark. Acts 293 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-22-301 to 16-22-307 (Michie
Supp. 1991)).
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sion. 3 5 The pertinent portion of the act states that "[tihe compensa-
tion of an attorney . . .for his services is governed by agreement,
expressed or implied, which is not restrained by law." '36 While it is
still too early to tell what effect, if any, this enactment will have on
the courts and legislatures of other states, it is clear that the Arkan-
sas legislature does not treat the client's absolute right to discharge
with much respect, and has overruled the Arkansas Supreme
Court's adoption of the new majority rule.
A related issue is the question of whether an attorney entitled to
recover under the terms of the contingency fee contract may elect to
recover in quantum meruit instead. Another basic tenet of contract
law is the availability of a choice of remedies which may be elected
by a nonbreaching party.2"7 While these principles would permit an
attorney to elect between a recovery on the express terms of the
contract or a recovery based upon quantum meruit,2 as many of the
courts that have permitted recovery of a contingent fee do not ad-
dress the question of whether a remedy was also available in quan-
tum meruit.23 9 The previously mentioned Arkansas enactment, how-
235. Lockley v. Easley, 786 S.W.2d 573, 575-76 (Ark. 1990). "Act 293 expressly declares the
holding of the Goodman case to be inconsistent with legislative intent behind the Attorneys [sic]
Lien Law. The act explicitly provides that attorneys may rely on their contractual rights with
clients and are entitled to obtain a lien for services based on such agreements." Id.
236. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-302 (Michie Supp. 1991) The act expressly stated "that an
attorney should have the right to rely on his contract with his client; and that the Attorney's Lien
Law should be reenacted to protect the contractual rights of attorneys." Id. § 16-22-301. The
legislature went on to state that the act was intended "to allow an attorney to obtain a lien for
services based on his or her agreement with his or her client and to provide for compensation in
case of a settlement or compromise without the consent of the attorney." Id.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 181-91.
238. Howell v. Kelly, 534 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976):
A party who has been damaged by a breach of contract has an election to pursue any
of three remedies. He may treat the contract as rescinded and may recover upon a
quantum meruit so far as he has performed; or he may keep the contract alive, for the
benefit of both parties, being at all times ready and able to perform; or, third, he may
treat the repudiation as putting an end to the contract for all purposes of perform-
ance, and sue for the profits he would have received if he had not been prevented from
performing.
Id. at 739-40. See also Crawford v. Logan, 656 S.W.2d 360, 364 (Tenn. 1983) (stating that an
attorney dismissed with cause is entitled to either a quantum meruit or contract recovery, which-
ever is less, while an attorney dismissed without cause is entitled to the larger of the two
recoveries).
239. See, e.g., Anderson v. Gailey, 606 P.2d 90 (Idaho 1980); Tonn v. Reuter, 95 N.W.2d 261
(Wis. 1959). But see Crawford, 656 S.W.2d 360. The likely reason for the failure to discuss an
election of remedies is that the attorney's recovery under the contingency fee contract will almost
always be greater than the amount recoverable under traditional quantum meruit valuation. This
is often precisely the attorney's motivation for entering such a contract. The risk of not recovering
for the client may be great, however, the possible rewards to the attorney usually compensate for
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ever, apparently recognizes the right to elect a quantum meruit
recovery since it expressly states that an attorney's recovery is not
"necessarily limited to the amount, if any, of the compromise or
settlement between the parties litigant. 240 In any event, the appli-
cation of quantum meruit to attorneys' fees will be examined more
fully in the next section.
b. Recovery only in quantum meruit
The rule in most jurisdictions today is that a discharged attorney
may recover only on a quantum meruit basis.241 These cases, how-
ever, have generally created a hybrid form of quantum meruit in
order to preserve the client's absolute right to discharge an attorney.
While the first jurisdiction to rule in this way was New York in
Martin v. Camp,42 the case most often cited as establishing today's
new rule is Fracasse v. Brent.24 In Fracasse, the Supreme Court of
California held that a client's discharge of her attorney, with or
without cause, "does not constitute a breach of contract for the rea-
son that it is a basic term of the contract, implied by law into it by
reason of the special relationship between the contracting parties,
that the client may terminate the contract at will." 244 Since a client
has an absolute right to discharge an attorney, with or without
cause, "[i]t would be anomalous and unjust to hold the client liable
in damages for exercising that basic implied right. ' 245 In other
words, there can be no election to recover contract damages instead
of quantum meruit since there has been no breach. The proper anal-
ysis would be that the contract is a nullity, thereby relegating any
claim by the attorney to one on a contract implied in law, or quasi-
contract. As such, the only recovery permitted in this situation is
one in quantum meruit.246
this added risk.
240. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-303(b)(1) (Michie Supp. 1991).
241. See, e.g., Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972) (en banc); Rosenberg v. Levin, 409
So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1982); Hopkins v. Steele, 297 S.E.2d 528 (Ga. 1982); Susan E. Loggans &
Assocs. v. Estate of Magid, 589 N.E.2d 603 (I1. App. Ct. 1992); Madison v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 663 P.2d 663 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983); Lawler v. Dunn, 176 N.W. 989 (Minn. 1920);
Covington v. Rhodes, 247 S.E.2d 305 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978); Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46 (N.Y.
1916); Fox & Assocs. v. Purdon, 541 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio 1989).
242. 114 N.E. 46 (N.Y. 1916).
243. 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972) (en banc).
244. Id. at 13.
245. Id.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 172-80.
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While there clearly are policy arguments both for and against
treating contingent fee contracts in this way, the greater problem
becomes the technical one of the application of quantum meruit
principles to this situation. Many courts continue to struggle with
the proper measure of compensation, when such compensation is
due, and whether or not there should be a limit on the amount re-
coverable. 4 The ultimate goal to be achieved by the use of quan-
tum meruit is that the attorney be compensated for the reasonable
value of her or his services up until the time of discharge, yet all the
while preserving the client's absolute right to discharge the
attorney.24 8
i. Contract price as a limit on the quantum meruit recovery
In traditional quantum meruit as an alternative contract remedy,
the contract price will usually limit a recovery only when a breach-
ing party seeks to recover the amount by which the nonbreacher has
been enriched.249 In this case, a "ratable portion" of the contract
acts as a ceiling on the claimant's recovery. 50 If the claimant did
not breach the contract, then fair market value will be the measure
of recovery, regardless of the contract price. 5' This is also true
when the claimant is seeking recovery under an implied-in-law con-
tract because an express contract cannot be enforced. This could
occur, for example, when the express contract is unenforceable be-
cause it violates the Statute of Frauds. 52 If the defendant refuses to
perform under the unenforceable contract, the plaintiffs recovery in
quantum meruit should not be limited by the contract price.2 "5 The
reasoning behind such a rule is.simple: the defendant should not be
able to benefit by his or her breach (or refusal to perform). 254 All of
247. See, e.g., Fracasse, 494 P.2d 9; Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1982).
248. Chambliss, Bahner & Crawford v. Luther, 531 S.W.2d 108, 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975).
249. See supra text accompanying notes 192-95.
250. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 374 (1981). See also supra text accompanying
note 194.
251. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371 (1981). See also supra text accompanying
note 184.
252. See, e.g., Bond v. Oak Mfg. Co., 293 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1961).
253. WOODWARD, supra note 40, at 165. See also United States v. Zara Contracting Co., 146
F.2d 606, 607 (2d Cir. 1944) (allowing collection of not only the contract price but also the
additional cost of "unexpected" soil conditions).
254. WOODWARD, supra note 40, at 165.
Where the value of the plaintiffs performance exceeds the contract price, he may
realize, it is true, returns larger than he contemplated when entering into the con-
tract. If it is the defendant who has refused to perform the contract, no injustice
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this can essentially be traced back to the fact that quantum meruit
is based on equitable considerations, and attempts to compensate
only for unjust enrichment.2 55
Returning to the case of attorneys' fees, the decisions do not com-
port well with the above analysis. In order to reach what is felt to be
a more equitable result, many courts limit the recovery in quantum
meruit by an attorney discharged without cause to the contract
price. 56 In cases not involving attorneys, the contract price limit is
usually imposed only on breaching parties.257 If such a limit were
not in place when lawyers sue clients for fees, the client could be
penalized even more than under the traditional rule, and the dis-
charged attorney may "receive a fee greater than he bargained for
under the terms of his contract. '258 Thus, the same justification be-
hind the abandonment of the traditional rule is applicable. If the
client has an absolute right to discharge the attorney, the client
should not be faulted or penalized for doing so. Any inequities to the
attorney, such as discharges immediately prior to a lucrative settle-
ment agreement, may sometimes be addressed in determining the
amount of the attorney's recovery. 259 The result, however, is that the
attorney is being treated more like a breaching party, who is gener-
ally limited in his quantum meruit recovery.
ii. Effect of the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the contingency
Another problem that inevitably arises is whether the recovery by
the attorney is predicated upon the occurrence of the contingency
itself. In dealing with this, the courts have generally been split.
results. The defendant suffers no loss, and moreover, if the plaintiff's recovery were
limited to the contract rate the defendant might actually profit by the contract which
he refuses to perform. If, on the other hand, it is the plaintiff who is in default, the
contract price should ordinarily be the limit of his recovery - assuming, of course,
that he should be allowed to recover at all. Otherwise he might profit by his default.
Id.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 172-78.
256. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1982).
257. See supra text accompanying notes 192-95.
258. Rosenberg, 409 So. 2d at 1021.
[Tihere is an overriding need to allow clients freedom to substitute attorneys without
economic penalty as a means of accomplishing the broad objective of fostering public
confidence in the legal profession. Failure to limit quantum meruit recovery defeats
the policy against penalizing the client for exercising his right to discharge.
Id. See Plaza Shoe Store, Inc. v. Hermel, Inc., 636 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. 1982) (en banc). But see
Hoddick, Reinwald, O'Connor & Marrack v. Lotsof, 719 P.2d 1107 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986).
259. See infra text accompanying notes 264-67.
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While some permit the discharged attorney to be compensated
before or without the occurrence of the contingency (i.e., a recovery
by the client), " ' others allow compensation only when the contin-
gency occurs.26' Thus, under the latter approach, if the client recov-
ers nothing, the discharged attorney is likewise not compensated.
This approach further hybridizes the recovery because although the
contract has been rendered a nullity by the discharge, the court re-
tains that portion relating to the contingency. By following such a
rule, these courts essentially place the discharged attorney at the
mercy of his former client and any attorney subsequently hired by
her. If the client simply drops the suit or the second attorney fails to
recover anything, the discharged attorney will receive nothing. 62
This reason alone could perhaps be seen as shifting the equities of
the case so that the attorney's recovery would not depend upon the
occurrence of the contingency. On the other hand, permitting recov-
ery by the discharged attorney when the client has in fact received
nothing runs counter to the reasons for permitting contingent fee
arrangements in the first place and also acts as another hindrance
on the client's right to discharge his attorney.263
In any event, the questions of the contract price as a limit and the
260. See, e.g., Trenti, Saxhaug, Berger, Roche, Stephenson, Richards & Aluni, Ltd. v. Nartnik,
439 N.W.2d 418, 421 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) ("Once a contingent fee agreement is terminated by
the client, the attorney, like any workman or supplier, is entitled to prompt payment for the rea-
sonable value of services performed."). Justice Sullivan, in his dissent in Fracasse v. Brent, stated:
[T]he majority also say that plaintiff's recovery for even the reasonable value of his
services is subject to the contractual term that compensation is contingent upon the
success of the defendant's personal injury suit. By thus selectively retaining parts of
the contract, even though it has been disaffirmed, the majority violate the rule that
the contract must be preserved or eliminated in its entirety. Their explanation that
plaintiff agreed "to take his chances on recovering any fee whatever" disregards the
substantial change in risk that results when plaintiff is prevented from managing the
litigation.
Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 23 (en bane) (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
261. See, e.g., Fracasse, 494 P.2d at 14 ("[T]he attorney's action for reasonable compensation
accrues only when the contingency stated in the original agreement has occurred.").
262. This is also a factor when the court imposes the contract price as a limit on the quantum
meruit recovery. If the second attorney does a poor job in representing the client, the "contract
price" that controls may be significantly lower, or even nonexistent.
263. The court in Rosenberg v. Levin stated the public policy consideration upon which the
modified quantum meruit is based:
We approve the philosophy that there is an overriding need to allow clients freedom to
substitute attorneys without economic penalty as a means of accomplishing the broad
objective of fostering public confidence in the legal profession. Failure to limit quan-
tum meruit recovery defeats the policy against penalizing the client for exercising his
right to discharge.
Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016, 1021 (Fla. 1982).
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occurrence of the contingency are certainly intertwined. It seems
difficult, if not impossible, for the contract price to act as a limit
without also requiring that the contingency called for actually oc-
cur. Neither issue can be positively resolved without jeopardizing
the rights of either the attorney or the client, and it may be more
logical to consider both as factors to be pondered when placing a
value on the attorney's services.
In summary, below is a chart reviewing the traditional and quan-
tum meruit recoveries for attorneys discharged without cause in
contingency fee arrangements.
Attorneys Discharged Without Cause
Traditional Rule - Contract Terms Control
-Terms of Contract Irrelevant
-Contract Price = Upper Limit of Recovery
Quantum Meruit HNo Recovery Unless Contingency Occurs
Both Contract Price and Occurrence of
Contingency Controls ("Full
Hybridization")
iii. Measuring the attorney's recovery in quantum meruit
In determining the value of the attorney's services, most courts
look to similar factors. Under traditional quantum meruit, the mea-
sure of the benefit received by the client, and thus the attorney's
recovery in qua-ntum meruit, should be the fair market value of the
attorney's services. This is true because the client requested that the
work be performed on his behalf.'" One might expect that this
would merely be the number of hours expended by the attorney
multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Courts, however, will gener-
ally look to other factors in determining the attorney's compensa-
tion.265 These include: "the skill and standing of the attorney em-
ployed, the nature of the cause, the novelty and difficulty of the
264. See supra text accompanying notes 175-78, 184-91. This is true regardless of whether one
views the claim as one on an implied-in-law contract or as an alternative contract remedy.
265. "A simple multiplication of hours by a minimum hourly fee is not by itself a proper
method to determine such charges." Hermann, Cahn & Schneider v. Viny, 537 N.E.2d 236, 241
(Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
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questions, the amount and importance of the'subject matter, the de-
gree of responsibility involved in the management of the case, the
time and labor required, the usual and customary charges in the
community and the benefits resulting to the client.1 26 6 Some courts
even consider the contingent fee contract itself to be relevant to a
valuation of the attorney's recovery.2 67
While this detailed analysis certainly differs from either of the
usual methods of determining a quantum meruit recovery (amount
defendant benefitted or fair market value of services), the purpose of
such an inquiry would seem to be to account for any of the inequi-
ties that might be present because of the unique situation. 68 In fact,
numerous courts have even stated that where an attorney is dis-
charged without cause "on the courthouse steps," the above analysis
can lead to the attorney recovering the full contingency fee. 289 A
reading of most of the cases, however, indicates that the number of
hours spent on the case will often be the most significant factor in
determining a recovery. This is true even though the attorney work-
ing under a contingent fee contract may not always keep detailed
time records.2 7' The court could then turn to a "lodestar" approach
for quantum meruit recoveries, although the "lodestar" has not been
used to date in this area71
266. Ashby v. Price, 445 N.E.2d 438, 444 (I11. App. Ct. 1983). See Johnson v. Georgia High-
way Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) (using similar factors). See also MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(B) (1982); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1983).
267. See, e.g., Rosenberg, 409 So. 2d at 1022. '[T]he trial court can consider the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the professional relationship between the attorney and client. Factors
such as time, the recovery sought, the skill demanded, the results obtained, and the attorney-client
contract itself will necessarily be relevant considerations." Id.
268. Most courts do not refer exclusively to either the amount the client has benefitted or the
fair market value of the attorney's services. Rather, they often state that the attorney should
recover a "reasonable fee." See, e.g., Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46, 48 (N.Y. 1916).
269. See, e.g., Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 14 (Cal. 1972) (en banc). "To the extent that
such discharge occurs 'on the courthouse steps,' where the client executes a settlement obtained
after much work by the attorney, the factors involved in a determination of reasonableness would
certainly justify a finding that the entire fee was the reasonable value of the attorney's services."
Id.
270. See Susan E. Loggans & Assocs. v. Estate of Magid, 589 N.E.2d 603, 606-10 (I1. App.
Ct. 1992), for a discussion of evidentiary problems in this area.
271. See Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. (Lindy II),
540 F.2d 102 (3rd Cir. 1976); Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp. (Lindy 1), 487 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1973). These cases establish a "lodestar" approach,
explained in GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & SUSAN P. KONIAK, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING
(1990):
Under this approach a basic figure of "lodestar" is derived by multiplying the number
of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate for the attorney's services.
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iv. The Louisiana reasonable percentage approach
A unique approach to valuing an attorney's quantum meruit re-
covery, which has yet to be followed by other jurisdictions, is that of
the Louisiana Supreme Court. In Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Products,
Inc.,272 the court adopted what can only be labeled a "hybrid" ver-
sion of the two prevailing rules. That court, in exercising its "au-
thority to regulate the practice of law," held that the client should
pay only "the highest ethical contingency percentage to which the
client contractually agreed in any of the contingency fee contracts
which he executed. 2 73 This contingency fee is then "allocated be-
tween or among the various attorneys involved in handling the claim
in question, such fee apportionment to be on the basis of factors
which are set forth in the Code of Professional Responsibility.1 274
Instead of giving the discharged attorney the reasonable value of her
services, this method of apportionment is more aptly described as
compensating the discharged attorney for her "reasonable
percentage."
While the approach that the Saucier court took arguably is the
most equitable for the client, it remains to be seen if any other
courts will subscribe to such a view. One difficulty that the client
may face, however, is obtaining a second attorney to represent him.
While it is a sound judicial approach to a complex problem, the
"reasonable percentage" rule does not comport well with any tradi-
tional contract principles.273
3. Conclusion - Attorneys' Fees
The courts' decisions regarding quantum meruit and contingent
fee contracts certainly vary quite a bit, and some of their reasoning
cannot be reconciled with traditional contract principles. In order to
enable clients to exercise their absolute right to discharge their at-
The "lodestar" sum may then be adjusted upward or downward to reflect the contin-
gent nature of the case or the unusual quality (good or bad) of the legal service in the
particular case.
Id. at 485.
272. 373 So. 2d 102 (La. 1978).
273. Id. at 118.
274. Id. But see Susan E. Loggans & Assocs., 589 N.E.2d at 614 (rejecting such an
apportionment).
275. The only analogy that can be drawn is to the rule limiting a breaching party's recovery in
quantum meruit to a "ratable portion" of the contract price. See supra text accompanying note
194.
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torneys, most courts limit the fees discharged attorneys can recover
by the application of a hybrid form of quantum meruit. Many es-
sentially treat the attorney discharged without cause as a breaching
party, limiting any fee recovery by contract contingencies and con-
tract price. The issue will certainly lead to much more debate in the
future, and the enactment by the Arkansas legislature may lead
others to evaluate their positions. One thing that the majority rule
should impress upon attorneys is that they may have to prove both
the work done and the market value of that work in order to re-
cover. The wedding between attorneys and time sheets is complete,
and this is true even when the time sheet would not normally be
used, such as in cases with the contingency of winning. Every attor-
ney runs the risk of being discharged and needing proof of effort in
order to recover any fee.
C. Government Contracts and Quantum Meruit
Cases involving contractual claims against the federal government
have produced some of the most confusing and inconsistent results
involving quantum meruit. Problems due to the ancient doctrine of
sovereign immunity have led courts to misapply the basic principles
of quantum meruit and contract law in order to find a remedy.
While the final outcomes may arguably be just, the paths taken to
get there do not always comport with settled principles.
1. Sovereign Immunity and the Tucker Act
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has its roots in medieval law
and is based upon the adage that "the King can do no wrong. 276
Although sovereign immunity is not specifically provided for in the
Constitution, 2 " it has survived to this day.21 8 In its more modern
sense, the doctrine simply means that the government "may not be
276. Wall & Childres, supra note 53, at 587 n.l. For a discussion of the history of sovereign
immunity, see W.S. Holdsworth, The History of Remedies Against the Crown, 38 L.Q. REV. 141
(1922).
277. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 428 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with
the majority contention that "sovereign immunity has no constitutional source").
278. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 645 n.28 (1980) ("[lIt has never been
understood how the doctrine of sovereign immunity came to be adopted in the American democ-
racy . . . . '). As one author has stated, "It is a magnificent historical irony that America, a
republic whose independence was declared in a document indicting the sovereign for treasonous
acts, should adopt without serious examination the doctrine of sovereign immunity." Jeremy
Travis, Note, Rethinking Sovereign Immunity After Bivens, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 597, 607 (1982).
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sued without its consent.' ' 279 The Supreme Court has justified such
a principle by stating that the doctrine is based upon "the logical
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends. 28 °
Prior to the passage of the Tucker Act28' in 1887, grievances
against the federal government could only be remedied by means of
private bills. 82 The Tucker Act specifically conferred jurisdiction in
the Court of Claims2 83 for "any claim against the United States
founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any
regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or im-
plied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliqui-
dated damages in cases not sounding in tort. '284 The Tucker Act
constituted the requisite consent by the government to be sued on
these specific types of claims; in other words, the Act was a congres-
sional "waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to those
claims." 25 Although significant changes have been made as far as
where an action must be brought, especially with the adoption of the
Contract Disputes Act of 1978,286 the scope of the congressional
waiver of sovereign immunity regarding contractual claims embod-
ied in the Tucker Act has remained unchanged: the federal govern-
ment may be sued upon any express or implied contract.287
While all may seem straightforward as far as quantum meruit
claims against the federal government are concerned, there is one
important limitation that has been imposed upon the Tucker Act
and all of its progeny: actions based upon contracts implied in law
may not be maintained against the government.2 88 Theoretically,
279. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983).
280. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
281. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505.
282. Wall & Childres, supra note 53, at 589-90.
283. The Court of Claims was established in 1855; however, before the passage of the Tucker
Act it only acted in an advisory capacity leaving the final decision on a claim to Congress. Act of
Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, § 1, 10 Stat. 612. See Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 213-15.
284. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1988). The Tucker Act also granted concurrent jurisdiction to
the district and circuit courts, depending on the amount of the claim.
285. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 212. "If a claim falls within the terms of the Tucker Act, the
United States has presumptively consented to suit." Id. at 216. Note, however, that the Tucker
Act did not create any substantive rights, rather it only conferred jurisdiction on the courts to
hear specific types of grievances against the federal government. See Hatzlachh Supply Co. v.
United States, 444 U.S. 460, 465 n.5 (1980).
286. Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (1978) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613
(1988)).
287. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491(a)(1) (1988).
288. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 219; Merritt v. United States, 267 U.S. 338, 341 (1925).
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therefore, a quantum meruit claim against the government could
only be brought upon an express or implied-in-fact contract. The
phrase "any express or implied contract," as contained in the
Tucker Act, has generally been interpreted to entail only actual con-
tracts, either express or implied-in-fact.289 This interpretation is ap-
parently based on congressional intent, although no such justifica-
tion can be found in either the legislative history290 or the relevant
case law.29 '
One commentator has suggested that at the time the Tucker Act
was passed, the term "implied contract" did not include "quasi-con-
tractual obligations, ' 292 however the Supreme Court's decision in
Clark v. United States29  could be interpreted to indicate other-
wise. " 4 A federal district court recently justified the rule on the ba-
sis that because the government must consent to be sued, it can only
be sued upon a contract that it "has actually assented to."'295 This
interpretation is questionable because only Congress itself can give
the requisite consent for the United States to be sued.296
289. Merritt, 267 U.S. at 340-41.
290. Wall & Childres, supra note 53, at 590 n.10.
291. See Michael C. Walch, Note, Dealing with a Not-So-Benevolent Uncle: Implied Contracts
with Federal Government Agencies, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1377 n.42 (1985), where the author
states that the precedents cited by the Supreme Court in Merritt, namely Tempel v. United
States, 248 U.S. 121 (1918), and Sutton v. United States, 256 U.S. 575 (1921), do not give any
basis for the rule. "The rule has thus been adopted without either analysis or consideration of its
effects." Walch, supra.
292. Wall & Childres, supra note 53, at 590 n.10.
293. 95 U.S. 539 (1877).
294. The Court in Clark permitted recovery on what was essentially an implied-in-law contract,
without ever discussing any distinction between implied-in-fact and implied-in-law contracts. Id.
While the case was decided before the Tucker Act, the applicable statute granted jurisdiction to
the Court of Claims for claims "upon any contract, express or implied." Act of Feb.124, 1855, ch.
122 § 1, 10 Stat. 612. As stated previously, however, before the Tucker Act the Court of Claims
only advised Congress of how the claim should be resolved. See supra note 283. The decision in
Clark could also merely be representative of the confusion that seems to be rampant in this area.
For further discussion of Clark, see infra text accompanying notes 308-19.
295. Gray v. Rankin, 721 F. Supp. 115, 117-18 (S.D. Miss. 1989).
[Tihe United States may be sued on both express and implied-in-fact contracts be-
cause in both cases the United States has actually assented to the contractual obliga-
tion and has thereby consented to suit on the contract. Contracts implied-in-law, on
the other hand, are not really contracts at all but merely remedies granted by the
court to enforce equitable or moral obligations in spite of the lack of assent .of the
party to be charged. It follows that in no sense has the United States consented to be
contractually bound by or to be sued upon a contract implied-in-law.
Id. (citations omitted).
296. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976). See also United States v. Mitchell,
463 U.S. 206, 215-16 (1983) ("The source of consent for such suits unmistakably lies in the
Tucker Act. Otherwise, it is doubtful that any consent would exist, for no contracting officer or
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2. Can Quantum Meruit Be Utilized for Government Contracts?:
The Legacy of Clark v. United States
One of the major problems that arises concerning government
contracts involves the myriad of statutes and regulations concerning
such contracts. Many of the reported cases arise due to some diver-
gence from proper procedure in the procurement process,297 or a
government official's lack of authority to contractually bind the gov-
ernment.298 Besides the normal contract requirements,299 "[a] con-
tract with the United States can only exist if the contracting govern-
ment agent has direct authority to obligate funds of the United
States."300 In addition, "the United States is not bound by a con-
tract entered into by a government official acting beyond the scope
of his authority." 0' Anyone attempting to enter into a contractual
agreement with the United States "assumes the risk of accurately
ascertaining that the Government's agents act within their author-
ity." 302 In other words, if a contract is entered into with a govern-
ment agent who either lacks the authority to do so, or goes beyond
the granted authority, "the Government is free to disavow the
contract." '
If the government disavows an express contract because of the
lack of an agent's authority or an agent exceeding his authority,
then by basic contract principles an implied-in-fact contract cannot
be created to make up for the deficiency. The only distinction be-
tween an express contract and one that is implied in fact is the type
of evidence used to establish the contract's existence; 304 all of the
other requirements remain. Therefore, as the Supreme Court suc-
other official is empowered to consent to suit against the United States.").
297. See, e.g., Prestex Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 367, 371 (Ct. Cl. 1963) ("It is contended
that the contracting officer violated specific statutory and regulatory requirements pertaining to
the bid and award of public contracts .... ").
298. See, e.g., Barnett v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 631, 638 (D.S.C. 1975) ("The individual
whom plaintiff claims bound the government in contract had no authority to bind the government
in any contract. ... )
299. "An implied-in-fact contract requires findings of: 1) mutuality of intent to contract; 2)
consideration; and, 3) lack of ambiguity in offer and acceptance." City of El Centro v. United
States, 922 F.2d 816, 820 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
300. Chavez v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 540, 543 (1989).
301. In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 831 F.2d 1221, 1229 (3d Cir. 1987).
302. OAO Corp. v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 91, 99 (1989); accord Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v.
Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947).
303. Prestex Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 367, 371 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
304. An express contract is evidenced by a writing, while one implied in fact is evidenced by
the conduct of the parties. See supra text accompanying notes 35-54.
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cinctly held in Sutton v. United States,"5 if a government official
could not have bound the United States to an express contract for
the particular work performed, neither could the official have bound
the government to an implied-in-fact contract for the services." 6 It
would seem elementary that if a federal official entered into an ex-
press contract that violated specific statutory provisions, thus ex-
ceeding the official's authority, then there could also be no implied-
in-fact contract entailing the same provisions. In such cases the only
possible way that one could recover against the government should
be on an implied-in-law contract basis, which would not be
permitted. 0
It should now be apparent that a quantum meruit claim against
the federal government may be difficult to maintain. With the mul-
titude of statutes and regulations regarding government contracts, it
is doubtful that any express or implied-in-fact contract calling for
payment of a "reasonable amount" for services would pass statutory
muster. Implied-in-law contract claims supposedly are not permitted
against the government, and the use of quantum meruit as an alter-
native contract remedy, while arguably valid when the government
contract itself is upheld, has rarely been addressed. A distinct line of
cases, originating before the Tucker Act was even adopted, however,
has clouded this conclusion and created a tenuous line of authority
for the maintenance of quantum meruit claims against the federal
government.
The Supreme Court's decision in Clark v. United States,30 8 which
was mentioned previously, has done much to confuse the rules of
quantum meruit as they pertain to government contracts. In Clark,
the plaintiff had entered into an oral contract with .the government
for use of the plaintiff's ship.309 A statute, however, required all
such contracts to be in writing, and, as the Court stated, was the
305. 256 U.S. 575 (1921).
306. Id. at 580. "[Since no official of the Government could have rendered it liable for this
work by an express contract, none can by his acts or omissions create a valid contract implied in
fact." Id. See also Chavez v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 540, 545 (1989) ("Implied-in-fact con-
tracts must be based on the conduct of authorized employees.").
307. Woodward, in his work The Law of Quasi Contracts, devotes much attention to situations
in which a party has relied upon an illegal contract, a contract entered into by an agent lacking
authority, and a contract violating the Statute of Frauds. In all of these cases, the only possible
recovery, according to Woodward, is in quasi-contract. While he never mentioned government
contracts in his work, the analogy is easy to draw. See WOODWARD, supra note 40.
308. 95 U.S. 539 (1877).
309. Id. at 541.
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"equivalent to prohibiting any other mode of making contracts."310
While the contract was rendered void by this statute, the Court nev-
ertheless permitted the plaintiff to recover for the use of the ship
"upon an implied contract for a quantum meruit."31'
The Court in Clark, while never specifically referring to either a
contract implied in fact or implied in law, drew an analogy to con-
tracts that violated the Statute of Frauds.3"2 As discussed above,
however, a recovery in quantum meruit when a contract is rendered
void by noncompliance with the Statute of Frauds lies in quasi-con-
tract, in other words as a contract implied in law. 3 ' If the recovery
was on an implied-in-fact contract, then the plaintiff's recovery
should have been exactly what the parties had agreed upon in the
first place, not in quantum meruit for "the value of the use of his
vessel." 314 An implied-in-fact contract is an actual contract, and the
intent of the parties is what a court should enforce. In Clark, there
was no indication that the two parties ever intended a recovery in
quantum meruit should the express oral contract fail. The major
shortcoming in Clark, therefore, is not the outcome itself, but rather
the basis for the Court's decision - either an improper decision to
permit a recovery on an implied-in-fact contract, or a conclusion
that implied-in-law contracts could be enforced against the
government.
Numerous subsequent decisions of various federal courts have fol-
lowed Clark to the extent that they have permitted quantum meruit
claims to be brought against the government when an express con-
tract covering the services involved is invalidated. 1 " The most sig-
nificant fact about these cases is not that the courts often purport to
find an implied-in-fact contract when one arguably cannot exist;316
310. Id. at 542.
311. Id. at 543.
312. Id.
313. WOODWARD, supra note 40, at 144-73. See supra note 307.
314. 95 U.S. at 543. The Court did, however, permit the plaintiff to recover the contract price
since it felt that this was the only evidence introduced as to the value of the services. Id.
315. See. e.g., United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520 (1961);
Crocker v. United States, 240 U.S. 74 (1916); United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387
(Fed. Cir. 1986); Yosemite Park v. United States, 582 F.2d 552 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Blake Constr. Co.
v. United States, 296 F.2d 393 (D.C. Cir. 1961). But see Chavez v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 540
(1989).
316. See Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The court in Amdahl stated that
"[a]dministrative actions taken in violation of statutory authorization or requirement are of no
effect." Id. at 392-93. It also stated that "'[f]ailure to follow the applicable rules negates the
agent's authority to enter into a contract binding on the government.'" Id. at 392 (quoting
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rather it is that they base the plaintiff's recovery on the fact that the
government has benefitted or been enriched by the plaintiff's ser-
vices.3 17 This is precisely the measure of damages for quantum me-
ruit on an implied-in-law contract. 318 Had an implied-in-fact con-
tract truly existed, the plaintiff's recovery should have been the
amount the parties agreed to.319 A case in point is Prestex Inc. v.
United States."'0
In Prestex, the plaintiff entered into a contract to supply cloth to
the United States Military Academy for uniforms. The plaintiff had
submitted a cloth sample with his bid that did not conform to the
required specifications.32 1 This was not discovered, however, until af-
ter the contract had been awarded to the plaintiff and he had pro-
duced all of the cloth necessary. 22  The court held that the con-
tracting officer had exceeded his authority by awarding a contract to
a party submitting a nonconforming bid, and therefore the contract
could be disavowed.32 a In an oft-quoted passage,3 24 however, the
Prestex court demonstrated the confusion present:
Even though a contract be unenforceable against the Government, because
not properly advertised, not authorized, or for some other reason, it is only
fair and just that the Government pay for goods delivered or services ren-
dered and accepted under it. In certain limited fact situations, therefore, the
courts will grant relief of a quasi-contractual nature when the Government
elects to rescind an invalid contract. No one would deny that ordinary prin-
ciples of equity and justice preclude the United States from retaining the
services, materials, and benefits and at the same time refusing to pay for
them on the ground that the contracting officer's promise was unauthorized,
Thomas R. Brous, Termination for Convenience: A Remedy for the Erroneous Award, 5 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 221, 222 (1972)). Nevertheless, the court decided that a recovery on an implied-in-fact
contract was permissible, even though the government's agent had exceeded his authority in enter-
ing into the express contract. Id. at 393.
317. Id. ("Where a benefit has been conferred by the contractor on the government in the form
of goods or services, which it accepted, a contractor may recover at least on a quantum valebant
or quantum meruit basis for the value of the conforming goods or services received by the govern-
ment prior to the rescission of the contract for invalidity.").
318. See supra text accompanying notes 175-78. While it is true that this can also be the
measure of recovery in quantum meruit as an alternative contract remedy, these courts invariably
base the recovery against the federal government on implied-in-fact contracts. See supra text
accompanying notes 282-96. However, these courts could not have properly used such a remedy
since they would first have to find a presently valid express or implied-in-fact contract,
319. See supra text accompanying notes 166-68.
320. 320 F.2d 367 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
321. Id. at 368-71.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 371-72.
324. See, e.g., United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387, 393 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Ocean
Technology, Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 288, 294 (1990).
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or unenforceable for some other reason. However, the basic fact of legal
significance charging the Government with liability in these situations is its
retention of benefits in the form of goods or services . 8
While "equity and justice" certainly lead to this conclusion, what
about the mandates from Merritt v. United Statesa26 and United
States v. Mitchell aI 7 stating that claims on implied-in-law contracts
(quasi-contracts) could not be brought against the United States?
It is difficult to draw a conclusion from this line of decisions be-
cause these courts seem to freely grant quantum meruit recoveries
on implied-in-law contracts without ever questioning their own juris-
diction to render such a decision.328 Most of these cases lead to the
result that if the plaintiff enters into an express contract with a gov-
ernment official having some measure of authority to bind the gov-
ernment in contract, then, even though the contract is later nullified,
the plaintiff will be compensated for the amount by which the gov-
ernment is enriched. 29 Other courts, however, continue to bar im-
plied-in-law claims from being brought against the government. 330
325. 320 F.2d at 373 (emphasis added). The court in Prestex, however, did not grant any
recovery to the plaintiff because "[n]o part of the order was accepted or used by the [govern-
ment]; nor was it unjustly enriched in any other way." Id. at 374.
326. 267 U.S. 338 (1925).
327. 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
328. See, e.g., Campbell v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 421 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1969). The court in
Campbell was more concerned with the measure of a quantum meruit recovery on an implied-in-
law contract, rather than whether it had jurisdiction to even hear the claim. Although the dissent
mentions the fact that the Court of Claims has no jurisdiction over implied-in-law contracts, noth-
ing more is ever said of it. Id. at 304. In addition, the court probably erred in allowing the plain-
tiff the fair market value of his services when the government official lacked any authority to bind
the government in contract. The proper measure.of recovery would have been the amount that the
government actually benefitted.
329. See Chavez v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 540, 547.(1989), where the court struggled with
this problem, and adopted this reasoning as a possible alternative "theory of contracts implied-in-
fact," at least when the federal government is involved. By interpreting the line of cases in this
way, the court was able to deny recovery on the basis that the agent purported to have contracted
with the plaintiff lacked any authority to do so. Id. The Chavez court also stated that the decision
by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Amdahl may have merely been that court's use
of its equitable powers. Id. The Claims Court, as an Article I court, has no such powers. Id. The
problem with this explanation is that sovereign immunity may negate a court's use of equity
against the United States.
330. Many of the decisions in which courts deny recovery on the basis that the claim is for an
implied-in-law contract deal with situations in which there was never even an attempt to enter into
an express contract with the government. See, e.g., Haberman v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 302
(1989); Gray v. Rankin, 721 F. Supp. 115 (S.D. Miss. 1989).
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3. Conclusion - Government Contracts
The courts continue to struggle with implied-in-law claims, and
therefore quantum meruit claims, against the federal government.
While the obvious solution would be for Congress to expressly allow
such claims, problems would still exist. Permitting implied-in-law
claims against the government would reduce the effectiveness of the
statutory and regulatory contract procedures. Compliance can often
be ensured by placing the burden of compliance on the contracting
party, which is in fact what the Tucker Act should do. While the
courts also consistently state that recoveries in quantum meruit in
these cases should generally be limited to the benefit actually re-
ceived by the government, many continue to rely upon the price in a
contract that they earlier declared void (a fair market value ap-
proach). 33 ' It is undoubtedly, however, unjust for the government to
receive a benefit at another's expense, and not be required to pay for
it.332
D. Palimony
The term "palimony" is generally regarded as loosely embodying
any claim by one former cohabitant against another (or the other's
estate) for some form of compensation, usually by way of either
monetary recompense or acquisition of property. 33 The frequent use
331. See Clark v. United States, 95 U.S. 539 (1877); Campbell, 421 F.2d 293. While benefit
may sometimes be equated with what was actually requested, in most government contract cases it
should not be. When a contracting agent exceeds his authority, for example, he has "requested"
something greater than his authorized limit. The government should not be required to adhere to a
contract that the agent should not have entered in the first place. Compare this situation to that of
a contract entered into between private parties which is later rendered a nullity because of impos-
sibility of performance. In this case the contract price should measure a quantum meruit recovery
for any services performed up until the voiding of the contract. See supra text accompanying
notes 175-78.
332. "Any person who has performed services for the Government, or whose property has been
taken, should be compensated . . . . [T]he Government should not retain a free benefit." Wall &
Childres, supra note 53, at 593.
333. This analysis will be limited to those instances where knowingly unmarried parties cohabi-
tate in a situation where sexual relations are involved. When this is not the case (e.g., a parent
and offspring cohabiting), many of the public policy issues are no longer involved. See, e.g., In re
Estate of Grossman, 27 N.W.2d 365 (Wis. 1947) (addressing a situation where a daughter moved
in with her parents in order to care for her sick mother). In addition, when the parties participate
in a marriage ceremony and one party has a good faith belief that a valid marriage exists, the
concept of a putative spouse may come into play. See infra note 335. Finally, occasionally one
party has been fraudulently induced to believe that he or she is married, and other remedies can
then be utilized by the court. See, e.g., In re Fox's Estate, 190 N.W. 90 (Wis. 1922). This section
will only deal with those situations where the parties are both aware that they are not legally
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of the term is unfortunate, however, in that these recoveries do not
normally resemble alimony in any way.8"" Like divorce law, how-
ever, cohabitants' rights against one another vary markedly from
state to state, depending on the courts' and legislatures' views of the
competing public policy interests involved.33 The results range from
a complete denial of recoveries to the recognition of the entire range
of legal and equitable remedies.
An initial distinction must be made in these cases between actions
for some type of property division and actions for compensation for
services rendered (quantum meruit). Often the two situations will
overlap, and it can be difficult to discern a distinction. In awarding
property to a cohabitant, courts often utilize such principles as con-
structive or resulting trust, partnership (express or implied), and
joint venture, in addition to the contractual-type claims. 3 6 One of
the problems inherent in making the distinction here is that often
the underlying basis for a court's award of property is the rendering
of services by the plaintiff for the defendant. A court may find an
express or implied agreement that, in exchange for the performance
of housekeeping and other services, the parties would share equally
in any property acquired during the relationship. 3 Additionally,
married.
334. Black's Law Dictionary defines alimony as "[a]llowances which husband or wife by court
order pays other spouse for maintenance while they are separated, or after they are divorced
(permanent alimony), or, temporarily, pending a suit for divorce (pendente lite)." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 72 (6th ed. 1990).
335. Two concepts that often are an integral part of these cases are common law marriages and
putative spouses. A common law marriage is defined as "[a] consummated agreement to marry,
between persons legally capable of making marriage contract, per verba de praesenti, followed by
cohabitation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 277 (6th ed. 1990). In addition, most courts require
that the parties hold themselves out to the public as being married. See Boswell v. Boswell, 497
So. 2d 479 (Ala. 1986). Common law marriage can occasionally be utilized in some of the situa-
tions that the present discussion deals with, however it may often be difficult to prove that an
agreement to be married existed. In addition, fewer than one-fourth of the states recognize com-
mon law marriages. WALTER WADLINGTON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC RELA-
TIONS 159 (2d ed. 1990). The concept of a putative spouse occasionally may also be a factor. A
putative spouse "may acquire the rights of a legal spouse . . . if he goes through a marriage
ceremony and cohabits with another in the good-faith belief that he is validly married." Hewitt v.
Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (I11. 1979). In addition, "[wihen he learns that the marriage is
not valid his status as a putative spouse terminates." Id. See also UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DI-
VORCE ACT § 209 (1973).
336. See, e.g., Carroll v. Lee, 712 P.2d 923, 927 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc) (noting that the "par-
ties had an implied partnership or joint enterprise agreement"); In re Estate of Eriksen, 337
N.W.2d 671, 674 (Minn. 1983) (stating that the "imposition of a constructive trust is justified to
prevent unjust enrichment").
337. See, e.g., Levar v. Elkins, 604 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1980). It should also be noted that in a
large number of cases the parties have also both contributed to the purchase price of the property
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the rendition of services may give rise to a claim for unjust enrich-
ment, which a court will sometimes remedy by means of a construc-
tive trust. 338 The principles underlying many of these property
claims, however, are identical to those involved in quantum meruit
claims, namely express or implied (in fact) contracts, and unjust en-
richment (contracts implied in law).3 39 Often the distinction can be
traced to the fact that the person performing services was doing so
with the expectation of sharing in any property acquired, as opposed
to an expectation of monetary compensation .3 4  As will be discussed
shortly, such an expectation of compensation, either by sharing in
property or by monetary payment, is usually necessary before a
quantum meruit recovery can be obtained.
At the outset it is important to keep in mind one principle that is
followed by most courts (at least in some form): "A bargain in
whole or in part for or in consideration of illicit sexual intercourse
or of a promise thereof is illegal." '3 4 ' How the courts implement this
rule, however, leads directly to many of the variances that are ob-
served. It is with this background in mind that the range of results
can be examined.
1. Complete Denial of Recovery
The most hostile reaction to unmarried cohabitants' recoveries
from their former partners is that of the Supreme Court of Illinois.
In Hewitt v. Hewitt,34 2 the court unequivocally stated that under no
circumstances would it countenance the maintenance of such claims.
in question, which is certainly another significant factor in a court's decision on property rights.
338. See, e.g., In re Estate of Eriksen, 337 N.W.2d 671 (Minn. 1983). As one Canadian author
noted, the equitable remedy of constructive trust should be utilized in these cases when the ser-
vices are "referrable to the property claimed to be the subject matter of the trust." Christine
Davies, Unjust Enrichment and the Remedies of Constructive Trust and Quantum Meruit, 25
ALTA. L. REV. 286, 294 (1987).
339. For a more complete treatment of cohabitants' property claims, see Joel E. Smith, Anno-
tation, Property Rights Arising From Relationship of Couple Cohabiting Without Marriage, 3
A.LR.4TH 13 (1981). See also supra text accompanying note 39 for implied-in-fact contracts and
supra text accompanying notes 40-41 for implied-in-law contracts.
340. See, e.g., Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 313 (Wis. 1987) (concluding that the plaintiff
sufficiently stated a claim for "defendant's breach of an express or an implied in fact contract to
share with the plaintiff the property accumulated through the efforts of both parties during their
relationship").
341. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 589 (1932). It is interesting to note that this provision
was left out of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, however the courts continue to rely on this
"rule of illegality." See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1208 (I11. 1979); Watts, 405 N.W.2d
at 311 (Wis. 1987).
342. 394 N.E.2d 1204 (I11, 1979).
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Although the plaintiff in Hewitt was seeking to recover "an equal
share of the profits and property accumulated by the parties, ' 3 43
and as such was not technically basing her claim on quantum me-
ruit, the opinion forecloses any possibility of a successful quantum
meruit claim for services rendered.
Victoria and Robert Hewitt lived together "in an unmarried fam-
ily-like relationship" for fifteen years. 44 Three children were born
out of this relationship, and the Hewitts "held themselves out as
husband and wife."' s45 Victoria further alleged that she had assisted
Robert in establishing his career, and that in return he promised to
"share his life, his future, his earnings and his property" with her.346
Victoria's claims were based on an express contract, an implied-in-
fact contract, fraud, and unjust enrichment. 4
In denying plaintiff recovery, the court quoted the "rule of illegal-
ity" referred to above whereby contracts whose consideration in-
volves sexual relations are facially invalid. 48 Although the court
conceded that the parties may form a contract independent of the
sexual relations, it had great difficulty in finding a contract "sepa-
rate and independent from the sexual activity," relegating such a
proposal to the recognition of common law marriage which had pre-
viously been abolished by the Illinois legislature. 49 Moreover, the
court found that recognizing property rights of unmarried cohabi-
tants would directly contravene the public policy of the state as indi-
cated by the state's domestic relations laws.3 "5  The court felt that
343. Id. at 1205.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
[11n reliance on defendant's promises she devoted her efforts to his professional educa-
tion and his establishment in the practice of pedodontia, obtaining financial assistance
from her parents for this purpose . . . she assisted defendant in his career with her
own special skills and although she was given payroll checks for these services she
placed them in a common fund.
Id.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 1208.
349. Id. at 1209.
[lt would seem more candid to acknowledge the return of varying forms of common
law marriage than to continue displaying the naivete we believe involved in the asser-
tion that there are involved in these relationships contracts separate and independent
from the sexual activity, and the assumption that those contracts would have been
entered into or would continue without that activity.
id.
350. Id. at 1207-11. "[W]e believe that the appellate court decision in this case contravenes the
Act's policy of strengthening and preserving the integrity of marriage." Id. at 1209.
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any change in this area should be done by the legislature itself, and
not by a court.38 1
The decision in Hewitt, while not explicitly dealing with a quan-
tum meruit claim for services, is by far the most limiting decision to
date in the area of palimony. The Illinois Supreme Court unequivo-
cally dismissed the plaintiff's claims based on express contract, im-
plied-in-fact contract, and unjust enrichment (quasi contract),-3 2
which are the three bases for quantum meruit claims. Its strong
stance clearly indicates that any claim arising out of the cohabita-
tion of knowingly unmarried cohabitants, whether for property or
for monetary compensation, will have a short life in Illinois.? 3
2. Recognition of Express Agreements Between Cohabitants
Although most recent cases do not create an outright ban on all
such recoveries, their impact sometimes nearly amounts to such
since they require an express agreement before compensation is
awarded. It is the unusual case where unmarried cohabitants enter
into an express contract concerning the rendition of and the pay-
ment for services,38 4 and without such an agreement no right to re-
covery may exist in some jurisdictions. While courts often circum-
vent the "rule of illegality" referred to previously by stating that a
contract between cohabitants is valid if the contract is "independent
of the illicit relationship,"3 65 a second hurdle must be overcome
351. Id. at 1211.
352. Id.
353. An appellate court decision in Illinois has suggested a possible limit on the breadth of the
Hewitt decision. See Spafford v. Coats, 455 N.E.2d 241 (I11. App. Ct. 1983). In Spafford, the
court permitted the plaintiff to assert a claim to property which she had personally paid for but
was titled in the name of her cohabitant. Id. at 245-46. In finessing its way around Hewitt, the
court stated that "where the claims do not arise from the relationship between the parties and are
not rights closely resembling those arising from conventional marriages, we conclude that the
public policy expressed in Hewitt does not bar judicial recognition of such claims." Id. at 245. It is
uncertain what effect, if any, this decision would have on a quantum meruit claim by a cohabitant
for services rendered.
354. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1207 (lI]t is unlikely that most couples who live together will
enter into express agreements regulating their property rights.").
355. In re Estate of Steffes, 290 N.W.2d 697, 709 (Wis. 1980).
A bargain between two people is not illegal merely because there is an illicit relation-
ship between the two so long as the bargain is independent of the illicit relationship
and the illicit relationship does not constitute any part of the consideration bargained
for and is not a condition of the bargain.
Id. See also Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (N.Y. 1980) (stating that New York has
long accepted express contracts between unmarried cohabitants when, "illicit sexual relations"
were not part of the consideration).
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when an express contract cannot be proven.
The major obstacle that has caused these courts to permit only
recoveries on express contracts is the problem of gratuitousness.
When services are rendered gratuitously to another, it should be ob-
vious that no implied-in-fact contract to pay for the services can
exist. Likewise, a court will not find an implied-in-law contract
when the services are rendered gratuitously because there has been
no unjust enrichment. 56 In other words, before services will be com-
pensated, at the very least the performing party must have some
expectation that there will be compensation for the work. In exam-
ining claims by cohabitants, nearly every court has established a
presumption that the relationship between the cohabitants "makes it
natural that the services were rendered gratuitously," '357 at least
when the services involved are in the nature of housekeeping, cook-
ing, companionship, etc. Several courts have refused to permit this
presumption to be overcome, thereby precluding implied-in-fact and
implied-in-law contracts, because of the problems of proof involved.
In Morone v. Morone,358 the highest court of New York permit-
ted a claim on an express contract to be brought for services per-
formed by a cohabitant, even if the contract was only oral. The
court, however, refused to permit an implied-in-fact contract action
to be brought. The New York court stated:
Absent an express agreement, there is no frame of reference against which
to compare the testimony presented and the character of the evidence that
can be presented becomes more evanescent. There is, therefore, substantially
greater risk of emotion-laden afterthought, not to mention fraud, in attempt-
ing to ascertain by implication what services, if any, were rendered gratui-
356. WOODWARD, supra note 40, at 74, 313-14. See also Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 123
(Cal. 1976) ("[A] nonmarital partner may recover in quantum meruit."); Roznowski v. Bozyk,
251 N.W.2d 606, 608 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) ("Without proof of the expectations of the parties,
the presumption of gratuity will overcome the usual contract implied by law to pay for what is
accepted."); Suggs v. Norris, 364 S.E.2d 159, 161 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing "recovery in
quantum meruit where the plaintiff can show that the services were rendered with an expectation
of monetary compensation").
357. Morone, 413 N.E.2d at 1157. See also In re Estate of Steffes, 290 N.W.2d 697 (Wis.
1980). The Steffes court stated:
The basis for applying the presumption of gratuitous service to persons cohabiting but
not related by marriage is that in the ordinary course of life persons living together in
a close relationship perform services for each other without expectation of payment in
the usual sense because the parties mutually care for each other's needs and perform
services for each other out of a feeling of affection or a sense of obligation.
Id. at 703.
358. 413 N.E.2d 1154.
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tously and what compensation, if any, the parties intended to be paid.3 59
While the court acknowledged that proof of an express contract
would also be problematic, it apparently felt that this would be
manageable.360 This same reasoning has persuaded courts of other
jurisdictions in a similar fashion 6' and the legislatures of Minne-
sota and Texas have gone so far as to require all agreements be-
tween cohabitants concerning property and financial matters to be
in writing. 62
3. Complete Recognition of Quantum Meruit Recovery
Many courts today will permit claims to be brought in quantum
meruit on express, implied-in-fact, and implied-in-law contracts.36 3
Although the celebrated case of Marvin v. Marvin364 has had much
to do with the liberalization of many courts' views, quantum meruit
recoveries on express as well as implied contracts had been recog-
nized occasionally well before the California court's decision. 36 5
Even with this generous view of quantum meruit claims between
unmarried cohabitants, however, a couple of obstacles must still be
overcome. The presumption of gratuitousness still remains a factor
in determining whether an implied-in-fact or implied-in-law con-
tract will exist. An implied-in-fact contract between the parties can
only exist when both expected that the performing party would be
compensated. 6 Once again the problem is one of proof. Courts are
often confronted with ambiguous "promises" such as the assurance
359. Id. at 1157. The Morone court went on to state that this was precisely the reason why
New York (and many other jurisdictions) had abolished common law marriage. Id. at 1157-58.
360. This may not be the case when the plaintiff is suing a deceased cohabitant's estate, as the
problems of proof become nearly equivalent to those that the Morone court felt existed in implied
contract claims. See, e.g., Neumann v. Rogstad, 757 P.2d 761, 764 (Mont. 1988) ("[Clourts have
long struggled with belated claims by family members and others against a person whose 'mouth
is stopt with dust.' ").
361. See, e.g., Tapley v. Tapley, 449 A.2d 1218 (N.H. 1982).
362. MINN. STAT, § 513.075 (1990); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (West 1990). For a
discussion of these provisions, see Buddy Brixey, Comment, Texas Legislation on the Statute of
Frauds in Palimony Suits: Is an Oral Contract Worth the Paper It's Written On?, 25 Hous. L.
REV. 979 (1988).
363. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976); Suggs v. Norris, 364 S.E.2d 159
(N.C. Ct. App. 1988); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. 1987). Many of these courts never
properly label the claims being brought as quantum meruit, however, and others only mention
quantum meruit in passing.
364. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
365. See, e.g., In re Anderson's Estate, 7 N.W.2d 823 (Wis. 1943).
366. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
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that one cohabitant would "be taken care of" in return for the fur-
nishing of housekeeping services." 7 Courts seem to vary widely in
their receptiveness to this type of testimony, and often their deci-
sions will turn on the type of services that were furnished.3 68 If the
work for which compensation is being sought consists of housekeep-
ing, cooking, companionship, or the like, courts seem to be more
reluctant to find an implied-in-fact contract.369 If, on the other
hand, one cohabitant works for the other's business enterprise, the
burden of rebutting the gratuitousness presumption may be less.3
Because many claimants for palimony compensation are women, the
courts' reluctance to value services associated with the home and
family can be seen as an example of sexism - the devaluation of
work in what is seen as the woman's separate sphere, the sphere of
the personal and private, as opposed to the public male sphere which
would include a business enterprise. 1
For a court to uphold a claim on an implied-in-law contract, it
must be shown only that the party rendering services expected to be
compensated in some way. A second problem exists however. If the
party rendering services also received some benefit through the rela-
tionship, then the value of that benefit must be subtracted from the
value of the work performedY.2 This is often fatal to implied-in-law
claims by cohabitants, as was the case in Marvin.3 73 If one party is
performing housekeeping services while the other is the sole mone-
tary provider to the relationship, the court may find that the benefit
received by the "stay-at-home" partner outweighed any value of the
housekeeping services.3 74
367. Johnston v. Estate of Phillips, 706 S.w.2d 554, 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). Although there
were some witnesses that testified as to these promises, the court found the evidence insufficient to
establish an implied-in-fact contract. Id. at 558-59.
368. Roznowski v. Bozyk, 251 N.W.2d 606, 608 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) ("The issue is a ques-
tion of fact, to be resolved by consideration of all of the circumstances, including the type of
services rendered.").
369. See Suggs v. Norris, 364 S.E.2d 159, 161 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming the trial court,
which denied the plaintiff's claims for housekeeping services but permitted the plaintiff to recover
for services performed in a produce business with the defendant).
370. See, e.g., Estate of Erickson, 722 S.W.2d 330 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
371. J. RALPH LINDGREN & NADINE TAUB. THE LAW OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 7 (1988).
372. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122-23 (Cal. 1976). ("[A] nonmarital partner may re-
cover in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of household services rendered less the reasona-
ble value of support received.").
373. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
374. See supra text accompanying note 371 for a discussion of the sexism implicit in this
distinction.
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CONCLUSION
The courts continue to struggle with quantum meruit claims, and
it is the hope of the author that this Article may help to alleviate
some of the confusion. As should be apparent, however, the basic
principles are not always followed in certain instances. While some
of these divergences are simply misunderstandings of the applicable
rules, others are dictated by the peculiarities of the situation. Public
policy often requires modification of the use of quantum meruit in
certain instances such as physicians' and attorneys' fees and
palimony. It is also interesting to note that just as the development
of quantum meruit itself first occurred in areas that were highly
regulated by governmental authority (i.e., the common callings), to-
day's deviations and novel approaches are occurring in fields that
often require more scrutiny. While many decisions are difficult to
justify, and likely will be short-lived, others may be the beginning of
future developments in the use of quantum meruit. Contrary to
what some may believe, quantum meruit is not a dead issue - it
simply is struggling beneath its own complexity.
It is the author's contention that this complexity and confusion
can be seen as positive. It demonstrates necessary flexibility in the
law. This Article has been a chronicle of the evolution and current
application of this flexibility. Quantum meruit is equity's flexibility
in law. As Portia contrasted justice and mercy, so has this Article
contrasted law and equity. The unique aspect of quantum meruit is
that it is concerned with remedy, with penalty. As Portia stated,
when dressed like a doctor of laws:
For the intent and purpose of the law
Hath full relation to the penalty . .. .75
If we can see penalty as legal remedy, then quantum meruit is the
flexibility in that remedy, the quality of mercy which is not strained.
375. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1, 11. 247-48 (William Lyon
Phelps ed., 1923).
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